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Probability and Uncertainty
Throughout the NSA, the ‘probability yardstick’ (as defined by the Professional Head of Intelligence 
Assessment (PHIA)) has been used to ensure consistency across the different threats and themes 
when assessing probability. The following defines the probability ranges considered when such 
language is used:
comprehensive analysis yet of the threats facing us. 
Against a backdrop of a growth in the volume and complexity across the threats, this assessment 
highlights:
•	 the	non-geographic	locus	of	many	threats;
•	 the	emergence	of	the	dark	web	as	an	enabler;
•	 a	revised	focus	on	illicit	financial	flows;
•	 the	overlaps	between	the	threat	areas;
•	 the	impact	of	technology;	and
•	 a	rapidly	changing	picture	in	some	areas.
This requires us to think differently about how we build capability in response and one of the purposes 
of this assessment is to inform that necessary strategic refocus. This includes our ambition to build a 
new National Data Exploitation Capability (NDEC) to deliver a central, sophisticated data exploitation 
response;	develop	a	world-class	response	to	economic	crime	through	a	multi-agency	National	
Economic	Crime	Centre	(NECC)	-	hosted	by	the	NCA	-	bringing	together	the	public	and	private	sectors	
more	closely	than	ever	before;	and	to	create	an	expanded	multi-agency	National	Assessments	Centre	
(NAC) to articulate a deep and comprehensive understanding of the SOC threat. 
Fundamentally it must also shape our operational response and we will continue to build on the 
outstanding operational results of the last year as we undertake investigations at the high end of high 
risk. In doing so, we value the support of our operational colleagues with whom we work (often in 
support of one another) as they help us achieve this. 
I trust this assessment is useful to colleagues across central Government, Police and Crime 
Commissioners, operational law enforcement partners, security services and the private sector in that 
regard. It has been drafted with the support of colleagues across many organisations based on their 
experiences and the intelligence gained from them. There is no doubt that we can only protect the 
citizens of the UK if we continue to rise to these new and changing challenges together.
Foreword 
from the Director General of 
the National Crime Agency
I am proud to introduce the National Strategic 
Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime for 2018. 
We, at the National Crime Agency, are ambitious in 
our endeavours to lead the fight to cut serious and 
organised	crime	and	this	intelligence-based	assessment	
builds on those previously issued, providing the most 
Lynne Owens CBE QPM MA
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The National Strategic Assessment (NSA) provides a single picture of the threat to the UK from serious 
and organised crime. It informs both the national response (what the priorities are and what action will 
be taken) and the expected results (how success will be measured).
On behalf of UK law enforcement, the NCA’s National Assessments Centre (NAC) has articulated the threat 
in this NSA. The preparation of this document involved wide consultation across the law enforcement 
community and its partners, including (but not limited to):
In order to coordinate response to the threats under its remit, the NCA has grouped the threats together 
into three ‘pillars’ of response (Vulnerabilities, Prosperity, Commodities), with aspects which cut across 
multiple threats captured separately. The NSA is structured to reflect the threat under these groupings.
Child Sexual Exploitation & 
Abuse (CSEA)
Organised Immigration 
Crime (OIC)
Modern Slavery & Human 
Trafficking (MSHT)
Money Laundering
Fraud & Other Economic 
Crime
Bribery, International 
Corruption & Sanctions 
Evasion
Cyber Crime
Firearms
Drugs
Vulnerabilities at the UK Border
Use of Technology in SOC
Prisons & Repeat Offenders
Corruption within the UK
Vulnerabilities Prosperity
Cross-Cutting Threat Enablers
Commodities
•	 National Crime Agency
•	 Police forces in England and Wales
•	 Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)
•	 Police Scotland
•	 Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs)
•	 Border Force
•	 Immigration Enforcement
•	 Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC)
•	 Her Majesty’s Prisons & Probation Service 
(HMPPS)
•	 Serious Fraud Office (SFO)
•	 Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)
•	 Cabinet Office
•	 Home Office
•	 Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)
•	 MI5, JTAC, SIS and GCHQ
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Profile of Serious and 
Organised Crime
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Overview of SOC in the UK
1. Serious and organised crime affects more 
UK citizens, more often, than any other 
national security threat. It has a daily impact 
on the UK’s public services, institutions, 
national reputation and infrastructure. 
2. The threat from SOC is increasing in both 
volume and complexity and will continue to 
do so in the short to medium term. Common 
drivers such as technology and international 
conflict will continue to place the threat on 
an upward trajectory, creating a challenging 
environment for the UK response. 
3. The SOC victim impact is wide ranging. 
We assess that the actual scale of Modern 
Slavery and Human Trafficking (MSHT) in the 
UK is continually and gradually increasing. 
Recorded sexual offences against children 
in the UK continue to increase year on 
year. Firearm offences increased by 27% 
in 2016/17 (year ending June 2017), and 
drugs deaths are at their highest level since 
comparable records began in 1993. There 
were 3.4m fraud offences in the year ending 
March 2017– almost a third of all crimes. 
‘County lines’ drug supply networks are 
now reported to affect all 43 police forces 
in England and Wales, as well as Police 
Scotland and the British Transport Police, 
exploiting young and vulnerable people and 
resulting in an increase in associated violent 
crime.
4. Individuals and communities also feel 
the impact of SOC through violence and 
intimidation that often accompanies various 
aspects of crime. Victims of SOC may suffer 
violence directly at the hands of criminals 
(particularly in threats such as MSHT 
and CSEA). However, local communities 
throughout the UK also feel the impact from 
other	SOC-related	action	such	as	organised	
crime groups (OCGs) maintaining control on 
their domains, being caught in the ‘crossfire’ 
of	inter-OCG	violence,	and	intimidation	of	
local businesses and individuals. 
5. SOC threats are increasingly interlinked. 
There are significant overlaps between 
MSHT and Organised Immigration Crime 
(OIC), especially in unstable states and 
conflict zones where large numbers of 
migrants are vulnerable to labour/sexual 
exploitation and debt bondage (both during 
their journeys and in migrant camps). 
Upstream, offenders often move seamlessly 
between MSHT and OIC. There is also a 
strong connection between drugs supply 
and firearms, with firearms being used for 
protecting and enabling the wider criminal 
interests of OCGs.
6. OCGs (of which there were 4,629 mapped 
in the UK at the end of 2017i) can also work 
together in criminal enterprises. New market 
entrants will integrate with existing criminal 
infrastructure such as money laundering 
networks and logistics providers to enable 
them to expand their activities and even 
distance themselves from the criminality. 
Additionally, strong ties exist between some 
SOC offenders through common criminal 
interest or affiliations formed in the prison 
environment. 
i Organised Crime Group Mapping (OCGM) is a law 
enforcement tool which maps characteristics of OCGs and 
individuals involved in SOC. Whilst figures collected can be a 
useful indicator of the current state of SOC in the UK, it does not 
capture the totality of SOC threats facing the UK (e.g. CSEA). It is 
subject	to	data	rationalisation	and	cleansing	from	year	to	year;	
it is because of this that the current number of groups mapped 
(4,629) is considerably lower than the previous year (5,866).
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Pathways into SOC
Motivations
7. Most criminality is conducted for the 
purposes of financial gain. Usually, this 
financial motivation will coexist with other 
factors that influence whether an individual 
will become involved in organised crime. 
Other key motivations include threats and 
coercion, family and social pressure, or an 
attraction to what is seen as a glamorous 
lifestyle. Vulnerabilities such as financial 
hardship can also leave an individual 
susceptible to criminal exploitation, or 
motivate their involvement. 
8. However, motivations can vary significantly 
between	crime	types;	for	example,	the	
majority of individuals who are involved in 
Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CSEA) 
undertake this criminality for the purposes 
of sexual gratification, with financial profit 
being	a	factor	in	some	cases	such	as	live-
streaming of abuse. Similarly, offenders who 
are involved in cyber crime are motivated by 
money but also for other reasons including 
ideology, the attraction of a challenge, and 
standing amongst their peers.
9. Alongside established routes, different 
pathways into serious organised criminality 
are emerging, most notably where criminals 
seek to take up of areas of technology 
enabled crime. Relatively easy access to 
established online criminal trading sites 
on both the mainstream internet and 
dark web, together with ready access to 
shared communities of interest provide 
opportunities for new and/or inexperienced 
criminals. Technological advancements 
and an increase in the use of social media, 
particularly by children, also offer more 
opportunities for those with a sexual 
interest in children.
Networks
10. Serious and organised criminals tend to 
operate in either loose networks based 
on trust, reputation and experience, or 
more structured and hierarchical groups 
(sometimes based on family links). 
Both loose and structured groups can 
cross ethnic boundaries and often have 
international ties which facilitate criminality.
11. Individuals become significant in their 
groups in many ways, often determined by 
the	nature	of	the	group.	In	family-based	
OCGs, the principal is often the oldest 
active member. Associative groups are 
often managed by those with the most 
experience. Propensity for violence and 
intimidation can also influence a nominal’s 
standing.
12. Some serious and organised criminals 
network whilst in prison. These individuals 
are then released back into society with 
new contacts and skills to progress in more 
serious and organised criminality. 
13. The majority of CSEA offending is committed 
by lone individuals, with offences involving 
more than one offender estimated at 
10% nationally. In the online environment 
individual offenders can be part of a 
wider CSEA offending community through 
anonymised online forums.
Backgrounds
14. The	socio-economic	background	of	an	
individual is known to influence their 
pathway into criminality. Some individuals 
gain their local notoriety through years of 
criminal activity. Others start their careers 
at the higher echelons of criminality by 
belonging to the same networks as existing 
high ranking criminals or family members, 
by being entrepreneurial in nature or owning 
crime-enabling	businesses.	Exposure	to	
criminality committed by family members 
from a formative age enables steady 
mentoring and normalises the activity.
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15. Young people brought up in deprived 
neighbourhoods by fragmented families 
are more susceptible to members of 
commodity-based	OCGs	or	street	gangs	
looking to recruit. Initially these young 
people	can	become	involved	in	anti-
social behaviour and petty crime before 
progressing into more significant criminality. 
16. As already noted, technological advances 
are	giving	rise	to	non-traditional	pathways	
to crime and offenders with different 
backgrounds. Recent notable investigations 
of serious criminal trading on the dark web 
highlighted that the traders concerned 
had little or no previous recorded criminal 
history, whilst many young people involved 
in – or on the cusp of involvement in – 
cyber dependent crime in the UK are also 
unlikely to have been involved previously in 
other crime.
17. Offending by under 18s forms a rising 
proportion of reported CSEA offending, 
even	when	excluding	incidents	of	self-
generated indecent imagery (which have 
been increasing since 2014).  There are 
emerging concerns that continued viewing 
of indecent images of children could lead 
to desensitisation, normalisation and 
escalation of offending.
18. Individuals possessing professional skills 
that can enable, conceal or advance 
unlawful activity in the financial/law 
enforcement arenas are recognised as 
highly valuable assets by organised 
criminals and can be at risk of being 
recruited or corrupted. The pathways into 
SOC for these offenders are currently not 
well understood. 
19. Pathways into criminality and the type of 
criminal activity subsequently undertaken 
can also, on occasion, be determined by 
local opportunities. Evidence of human 
trafficking for the purposes of labour 
exploitation appears to be prevalent in 
areas where restaurants, agricultural and 
cleaning sectors are in abundance. 
The Global Perspective
20. Most of the UK serious and organised crime 
threat has an international dimension. 
OCGs smuggle, traffic and exploit 
vulnerable	people;	they	defraud	the	public	
and businesses from overseas through 
economic	and	cyber	crime;	and	they	source	
illicit goods overseas such as firearms and 
drugs. They seek to move, hide and store 
criminal proceeds within, through or from 
the UK. UK sex offenders abuse children in 
upstream locations or view CSEA emanating 
from overseas. Transnational OCGs exploit 
vulnerabilities such as inadequate law 
enforcement, border controls and criminal 
justice structures, weaknesses in legislation, 
corruption, and vulnerable communities. 
21. As the threat from SOC changes and 
develops, many of the influencing factors 
and enablers (such as new technology, 
political instability, or civil unrest and war) 
originate away from the UK, meaning we 
have to take a truly global view to have any 
meaningful impact closer to home.
22. Collaboration with international partners 
both bilaterally and through multilateral 
institutions and forums (such as Europol 
and Interpol) provides opportunities 
to extend our reach and cooperate 
strategically and operationally, to tackle 
common threats and to share/leverage 
capabilities against serious and organised 
crime. In doing so we are able to undertake 
activity overseas that might otherwise be 
beyond our reach, and to brigade our efforts 
with likeminded partners to achieve more 
impactive and effective law enforcement 
outcomes.
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SOC in Scotland
Written in association with Police Scotland
23. There are 164 known OCGs comprising 
3,282 individuals being investigated by 
police and partners in Scotland. The number 
of OCGs is decreasing but the threat is 
increasing, evidenced by the rise in the 
number	of	high-scoring	threat	groups	
and an increase in the top 20% threshold 
threat score. We assess that the escalation 
in threat is, in part, linked to the ongoing 
feuds, violence and firearms incidents 
relating to OCGs in the central belt of 
Scotland.
24. The	groups	in	the	top-scoring	20%	of	those	
mapped are predominantly involved in 
violence, money laundering, and drugs 
(with the majority involved in more than 
one class of drug). Of those groups 86% 
have used violence and intimidation, 82% 
have nominals incarcerated in prison, 79% 
are	linked	to	at	least	one	quasi-legitimate	
business enterprise, 64% have access to 
firearms, and 61% are assessed to be using 
encrypted communication. 
Drug Trafficking
25. Drug trafficking remains a high volume 
threat	with	two-thirds	of	OCGs	in	Scotland	
involved;	cocaine,	heroin	and	cannabis	
continue to be the most popular. Spain, 
followed by the Netherlands and China, 
are the main supply areas for drugs into 
Scotland from outside the UK.
26. Significant SOC connections exist between 
Scotland and the north west of England, 
predominantly Merseyside. This analysis is 
consistent with intelligence that the north 
west of England, predominantly Liverpool, 
continues to be the primary source of drug 
supply into Scotland. Other connections 
exist	between	Scotland-based	OCGs	and	
those in West Midlands and London.
27. There is a current threat and harm 
presented by feuds and rivalries between 
six main OCGs operating in the east and 
west of Scotland. The situation escalated 
in late 2016 resulting in the shooting and 
murder of an individual connected to OCGs. 
This then led to numerous reported and 
unreported acts of further violence. The 
risk is heightened by access to firearms, 
including automatic weapons. A number of 
the attacks have been carried out in public 
places. Despite recent firearms seizures, it 
is assessed that the OCGs continue to have 
ready access to firearms that some may be 
willing to use within public places.
Human Trafficking 
28. In Scotland, the OCGs involved in human 
trafficking for the purposes of sexual 
exploitation primarily involve foreign 
nationals where both the perpetrators and 
their adult female victims share a common 
nationality of Romanian or Slovakian. Those 
involved in labour exploitation usually 
involve perpetrators who share a common 
country of origin as their victims, including 
Latvia, Vietnam and China. 
29. Scotland-based	OCGs	involved	in	human	
trafficking operate largely independently 
of one another with no definite links or 
cohesion identified. They also tend to 
be	poly-criminal	in	nature,	engaging	in	
criminality such as drug trafficking, violence 
and sexual offending.
Financial Crime
30. A variety of emerging fraud types are 
identified including pension fund fraud, 
vishing fraud and fraud where road traffic 
accidents are manufactured to facilitate 
false claims to insurance companies. 
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Organised Acquisitive Crime
31. Scotland-based	OCGs	continue	to	be	
involved in acquisitive crime where the 
majority of groups are also involved in 
drugs, violence and financial crime. The 
most common type of property stolen is 
motor vehicles, mainly for use as enablers 
of other criminal activity. 2017 also saw 
Scotland-based	OCGs	being	involved	in	ATM	
theft, metal theft, and bogus crime.
Borders
32. Similar	to	other	parts	of	the	UK,	Scotland-
based OCGs are attempting to exploit 
airports to facilitate human trafficking, drug 
supply, movement of cash and importation 
of tobacco and cigarettes. Intelligence is 
limited regarding criminal use of air freight 
in Scotland, although we assess it is a 
continued threat. 
33. Commercial maritime is also used in relation 
to criminality including human trafficking, 
immigration abuse, and potential extremist 
travel. Abuse of the Common Travel Area 
(CTA) is evident in Scotland at the ports of 
Loch Ryan and Cairnryan. 
34. There	have	been	instances	of	Roll-On/
Roll-Off	(RoRo)	freight	being	abused	for	the	
movement of illegal immigrants and Class A 
drugs into Scotland.
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SOC in Northern Ireland
35. PSNI currently are sighted on a total of 83 
OCGs. 58% of these OCGs are engaged 
in two or more categories of organised 
criminality, whilst 65% are involved in drugs 
criminality.
Cross Border Criminality
36. The Common Travel Area (CTA) is open to 
exploitation by criminals, illegal immigrants 
and extremists who use the border to 
facilitate and enable criminality. There 
is significant interaction between OCGs 
operating on both sides of the border, 
working together across a number of 
types of organised crime including drug 
trafficking, excise fraud, human trafficking, 
environmental/waste crime, burglary, 
firearms purchases/movement, plant theft, 
agricultural crime, and money laundering. 
Recent analysis identified that almost 
half of OCGs managed and investigated 
by PSNI are known to have strong links 
and associations with OCGs based in the 
Republic of Ireland (ROI).
37. A number of OCGs have recently engaged 
in	drug-related	criminality,	primarily	the	
purchase of drugs (including heroin, 
cocaine and cannabis) in the ROI and the 
subsequent importation of these drugs 
into Northern Ireland. Further OCGs have 
been engaged in tax and excise evasion 
(primarily the smuggling of contraband and 
counterfeit goods). 
38. Mobile organised crime groups have 
been an issue across the island in recent 
years, with a number of groups travelling 
throughout the ROI carrying out burglaries 
of commercial and residential properties, 
but also travelling between ROI and 
Northern Ireland to commit crime. These 
groupings readily engage in violence, 
meaning victims and anyone who disturbs 
their activities (including law enforcement 
personnel) are at risk.
Drugs Trafficking
39. Deaths as a result of drugs misuse continue 
to be a concern, with a variety of both illegal 
and prescription drugs suspected of being a 
contributory factor in a number of cases. 
40. Drug importation is conducted via various 
methods: 
•	 concealed	within	legitimate	goods;
•	 via haulage companies (used to 
transport drugs on land and via ferries to 
ROI	and	NI	ports);
•	 in personal cars/vans and by public 
transport (the latter is particularly 
prevalent	in	heroin	imports	from	Dublin);	
and
•	 via courier networks involved in postal 
deliveries (with an ever increasing 
number of customers using online 
services to make purchases for all types 
of commodities including drugs, firearms, 
counterfeit and contraband tobacco 
products and other illegal commodities).
41. We assess there is a potential for drone 
technology to be used in the near future to 
assist in the importation and, more likely, 
local distribution of drugs. This will allow 
suppliers the ability to carry out deliveries 
themselves, cutting out a middle man and 
remain ‘hands off’ the commodity.
Money Laundering
42. Professional enablers from the banking, 
accounting and legal world are used to 
facilitate the legitimisation of criminal 
finances and are perpetuating the problem 
by refinancing further criminality. 
Written in association with the Police Service of Northern Ireland
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Extortion
43. Information held by PSNI suggests that 
paramilitary groups (both loyalist and 
republican), or individuals claiming to be 
from these groups, continue to be actively 
involved in extortion attempts, particularly 
the racketeering of small businesses and 
building sites across Northern Ireland. It is 
likely	that	significant	under-reporting	occurs	
due to an unwillingness of victims to come 
forward to PSNI. Illegal money lending/
loan sharking is also likely to continue, with 
similar	challenges	of	under-reporting.	
44. Alongside local group involvement, there is 
an increasing number of online extortions 
in which money is sought by criminals by 
threatening to damage the reputation of an 
individual or business. Various social media 
platforms and messaging services are being 
used to facilitate these offences. Again, it is 
likely that many of these crimes do not get 
reported to the police.
Human Trafficking
45. During the 2016/17 financial year, the PSNI 
Human Trafficking Unit (HTU) conducted 
308	screening	assessments;	an	increase	
from the 2015/16 financial year (which 
saw 252 persons screened). From the 308 
screening assessments in 2016/17, 34 
potential victims of human trafficking were 
identified in Northern Ireland. The main 
issues for Northern Irish law enforcement 
continue to centre on sexual and labour 
exploitation. 
Organised Immigration Crime
46. A key priority within Immigration 
Enforcement NI remains the detection and 
prosecution of high harm foreign national 
offenders	who	attempt	to	re-enter	Great	
Britain using a circuitous route through 
abuse of the Common Travel Area. 
47. A number of detections have been made 
of	offenders	who	had	re-entered	the	UK	in	
breach of a Deportation Order and were 
intending	to	re-enter	the	mainland	from	a	
Northern Ireland port. 
Excise Fraud
48. Excise fraud across the Northern Ireland/
ROI border continues to be a major concern. 
The border represents a risk specifically 
in terms of oils and tobacco fraud due to 
the nature of OCG activity, the ease with 
which OCGs can conduct their business, 
and difficulties in enforcing border controls. 
Within Northern Ireland, the primary 
areas of concern for law enforcement are 
Londonderry	and	Armagh	where	inter-
connected and well established networks 
organise and facilitate excise frauds. 
Paramilitary Involvement in Serious and 
Organised Crime
49. More than 20% of the OCGs known to and 
investigated by PSNI have direct links with 
paramilitary (both loyalist and republican) 
organisations. 
50. These OCGs are engaged in a wide 
range of criminal activity including the 
importation and/or distribution of drugs/
contraband goods (primarily cigarettes), 
extortion (of legitimate businesses and 
individuals involved in drug related 
crime), protection rackets, illegal lending, 
and money laundering. These groups 
have also engaged in violent activities 
including murder, attempted murder, 
paramilitary style shootings and beatings, 
the deployment of IEDs, and other forms of 
intimidation and public disorder.
51. It is difficult to assess the proportion of the 
proceeds of the criminality of these groups 
that are used to fund paramiltarism. We 
assess that much of this is intended for 
the personal gain of individuals involved in 
such criminality.
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Horizon Scanning: Trends to 2023
52. Crime and law enforcement do not operate 
in	a	vacuum.	This	section	provides	a	top-
level view of some of the complex and 
overlapping trends, drivers and enablers 
that	have	the	potential	to	-	directly	or	
indirectly	-	affect	the	criminal	and	law	
enforcement environment in the next five 
years. 
Technology
53. Developments in technology will continue 
to transform the future crime landscape. 
Advances in information/communication 
technologies (especially the introduction 
of 5G), artificial intelligence, the Internet 
of	Things	(IoT),	and	autonomous/semi-
autonomous systems all have the potential 
to initiate significant disruptive change to 
the technology landscape. It is probable 
that their development will present 
opportunities for specific areas of criminal 
and law enforcement exploitation. 
54. The use of technologies such as the dark 
web, encryption, virtual private networks 
(VPN) and virtual currencies will support 
fast, ‘secure’ and anonymous operating 
environments, facilitating all levels of 
criminality. The increasingly ubiquitous 
‘by default’ nature of these enabling 
technologies will continue to lower the 
barriers to entry for some types of cyber 
enabled crime.
55. The rapid and often unpredictable 
nature of technological change and its 
subsequent application adds further 
layers of complication and uncertainty for 
developers, users and law enforcement. 
Some trends will be influenced by changing 
user behaviour rather than the technology 
itself.
56. Technology will continue its complex and 
global spread, with cyber crime very likely 
becoming more prevalent in countries which 
lack the capacity and/or capability to mount 
an effective response. This will increase the 
number of countries which pose a potential 
threat to the UK. It is possible that cyber 
criminal activity will locate within ‘safe 
havens’	in	more	hard-to-reach	firewalled	
and ‘siloed’ jurisdictions. 
Conflict and Migration
57. It is almost certain that political and 
economic pressures and instability will 
continue to drive significant levels of 
legal and illegal migration, regionally and 
globally.
58. Global instability, humanitarian crises, war 
and persecution are likely to continue to 
create opportunities for criminal activity. 
Areas of instability, such as Libya, Syria 
and Ukraine are likely to continue to serve 
as source countries and transit routes for 
criminal exploitation. 
59. It is probable that the number of 
international migrants, refugees, asylum 
seekers and other displaced people will 
continue to grow due to displacement from 
conflict and other tensions. 
60. Displacements could also be instigated 
by environmental pressures and events. 
It is probable that in the next five years 
we will experience more regular extreme 
climate events, causing people to move 
-	either	temporarily	or	permanently	-	to	
more hospitable locations. The concept of 
climate change refugee is likely to become 
increasingly accepted. 
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61. A decrease in the scale of conflict in 
countries such as Syria in the period to 
2023 would lead to the return of UK citizens 
and possibly weaponry from war zones, with 
potential implications for the terrorist threat 
and links to criminal diaspora communities.
62. It is likely that future conflict will be less 
confined to the traditional battlefield and 
will	increasingly	encroach	on	a	cyber-
environment, with the aim of disrupting 
societies, leading to a decreasing divide 
between cyber conflict and cyber crime.
Brexit
63. The result of the EU referendum vote has 
had little impact on criminal activity or 
international law enforcement cooperation 
to date, but it will be a key driver of 
uncertainty in the next five years.
64. Criminals are not constrained by 
geographical or jurisdictional boundaries 
and are inherently opportunistic. We expect 
that many will strive to take advantage 
of the opportunities that Brexit might 
present, for example from the design and 
implementation of a new UK customs 
system or from increased challenges for 
EU and UK law enforcement in locating and 
extraditing international fugitives if the UK 
were to lose enforcement or intelligence 
sharing tools. However, some of the impacts 
of Brexit have the potential to work in 
favour of law enforcement, including greater 
discretion over the movement of goods and 
people.
Conclusion
65. Excluding those crimes created by the 
introduction of new or changing legislation, 
it is unlikely that we will see any completely 
new types of serious and organised crime in 
2023. It is likely, however, that we will see 
existing crime operating in new ways and in 
new places.
66. Global drivers and trends both causing 
and caused by global and regional 
uncertainty and instability will continue 
to shape public attitudes and behaviour, 
criminal activity and the associated law 
enforcement response. Both crime and 
law enforcement will need to operate in a 
more uncertain, more diverse and complex 
world. Events that previously might have 
seemed remote and of little consequence 
will be increasingly significant when viewed 
in terms of their implications for organised 
crime.
67. Within this complex world, much change 
will still be driven by technology. In an 
increasingly	technology-dependent	society,	
the implications of both intentional and 
inadvertent criminal behaviour will increase. 
As technology becomes increasingly 
autonomous, issues of responsibility and 
blame will also likely grow in importance. 
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Use of Technology in SOC
Criminal Use of Encryption
68. Since 2010, communication service 
providers (CSPs) have migrated to 
encrypted	services	‘by	default’;	a	process	
that accelerated following the Snowden 
disclosures. Now, the majority of internet 
traffic is encryptedi and publically available 
mobile	device	apps	offer	end-to-endii 
encryption as standard. Whilst this 
means enhanced privacy for the users, 
the use of encryption is impacting on law 
enforcement’s ability to collect intelligence 
and evidence.
69. Encryption provides important benefits 
to the UK public and economy: it enables 
digital commerce, ensures security on 
the web and increases privacy. However, 
such technology has become an enabler 
to criminality, presenting serious 
challenges for law enforcement. We now 
observe the use of encryption in criminal 
communications across all threat areas and 
across all levels within criminal hierarchies.
70. Criminals will almost certainly continue 
to prioritise communications security. 
Encryption built in to mainstream products 
will continue to expand and will offer 
criminals enhanced protection by default, 
rather than design. The pace of these 
developments will continue to challenge law 
enforcement capability and resource, with 
narrowing options for mitigation. 
71. While encrypted communications platforms 
are legitimate products welcomed by 
consumers and privacy advocates, they 
will increasingly erode law enforcement’s 
capability to detect and deter criminal 
activity. 
i Through HTTPS
ii	 End-to-end	encryption	is	where	the	sending	and	
receiving devices (e.g. two smartphones engaged in message 
chat) encrypt/decrypt their messages directly, rather than 
passing it through a central server to encrypt/decrypt for them. 
Criminal Use of the Dark Web 
72. The combination of encryption and 
anonymisation pose substantial challenges 
to law enforcement’s collection of 
intelligence and evidence. The impact of 
anonymisation techniques is as significant 
as encryption: any available data that is 
not attributable to a user can limit law 
enforcement capability. This is likely to 
be exacerbated as criminals increasingly 
adopt anonymisation technology (e.g. ToR, 
VPNs, ‘spoofing’ and services with weak 
registration). The dark web is a primary 
forum for the illicit use of anonymisation 
techniques. The dark web is a small section 
of the Internet that is intentionally hidden 
and inaccessible through standard web 
browsers. It is primarily accessed through 
specialised encryption software, such as 
The Onion Router (Tor), the Invisible Internet 
Project (I2P) and Freenet. Whilst the dark 
web helps anonymise and obscure activity, 
the services on offer are not fundamentally 
different from their mainstream Internet 
equivalents. These include marketplaces 
where illegal commodities are traded, 
forums for the sharing of CSEA material, 
networking with other criminals and a 
number of enabling services such as 
cryptocurrency exchanges. 
73. The range of criminal services offered on Tor 
cover most threat areas. Cyber crime and 
fraud appear to be the most prevalent, but 
there are also sites offering commodities 
such as drugs and firearms, as well as 
facilitating CSEA and MSHT. The majority 
of services offered, particularly with regard 
to commodities, are offered in dark web 
‘marketplaces’ (where multiple suppliers 
offer goods in one place) as opposed to 
individual supplier Tor sites. 
74. Owing to law enforcement action, fraud 
or commercial failure, the vast majority 
of dark web marketplaces have a short 
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lifespan. However, there have been some 
high profile marketplaces that have 
dominated the illegal commodity trade. 
These include the original Silk Road, 
Evolution,	SilkRoad	3.1	and	-	more	recently	
-	AlphaBay.	The	emergence	of	these	sites	
as market leaders was, in part, a result 
of the disruption of their predecessors, 
with activity being displaced rather than 
eradicated. ‘The Dream Market’ is currently 
the most prominent and is assessed to be 
benefitting from the Alphabay and Hansa 
law enforcement takedowns in 2017. 
75. Generally-trusted,	anonymous	payment	
systems are the key enabler for dark web 
trade. Bitcoin is the preferred payment 
method, although various marketplaces 
and forums offer additional cryptocurrency 
options, including Monero and Ethereum. 
There are also a host of enabling services 
underpinning the dark web economy, 
including bitcoin mixing services, virtual 
currency exchanges, hosting services, onion 
web services and user confidence tools 
such	as	multi-signature	wallets.	
76. Drugs remain the main illicit commodity 
sold on dark web market places, although 
there is an increasingly diverse set 
of commodities on offer. Identity and 
Government Gateway credentials (both 
used for repayment fraud against HMRC), 
identity documents and compromised 
credit card data are also offered for sale. 
Ransomware and malware strains are sold 
on	the	dark	web,	as	the	‘as-a-service’	model	
continues to lower the threshold for entry 
into cybercrime.
77. It is less common to see firearms for sale 
and extremely rare to see CSEA material on 
the higher profile dark marketplaces – CSEA 
material tends to be concentrated in niche 
sites. Ultimately, these marketplaces rely 
on availability and reputation in order to be 
successful and these can be jeopardised by 
association	with	this	type	of	material;	we	
have seen examples where administrators 
have restricted or banned material linked 
to CSEA on their site. As high priority threat 
areas for law enforcement, domains that 
host firearms and CSEA material are also 
likely to attract a greater degree of law 
enforcement attention. 
78. The volume of illegal trading on the dark 
web has increased since 2011, and it is 
likely that this trend will continue in the 
future. The barriers to entry to illicit dark 
marketplaces and specialist criminal 
websites are often very low making them 
convenient and easy to use. New users 
require relatively little knowledge and no 
previous or specialist contacts in order 
to access them. Recent technological 
developments have enabled Tor and 
I2P compatibility with the majority of 
smartphones and Internet enabled mobile 
devices. Additional security measures are 
in place for some sites within the dark web 
and many operate on an invite only basis for 
new members. 
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Vulnerabilities at the UK Border
79. Exploitation and abuse of the UK border 
enables a wide range of threats to impact 
the UK. The past year has shown that these 
threats persist, and individuals and OCGs 
continue to exploit border vulnerabilities 
with increasing levels of sophistication. 
OCGs are commonly involved in multiple 
threats and will choose the modes most 
suited to their commodity. 
Border Corruption
80. ‘Border corruption’ refers to the abuse of 
privileged access to physical areas and 
corporate systems at ports and airports to 
facilitate serious and organised crime. It 
applies to both public and private sectors. 
81. Corruption at the border mainly facilitates 
the movement of Class A drugs into the UK. 
However it can also facilitate the movement 
of other illicit commodities as demonstrated 
in an incident in 2017, where a UK official 
was arrested following a seizure of drugs 
and firearms in France which were being 
brought into the UK.
General Aviation (GA)
82. The UK has over 3,000 airstrips, presenting 
opportunities for criminals to use GA 
to exploit the UK border. Intelligence 
demonstrates that OCGs have made 
significant investments in the purchase or 
hire of aircraft to facilitate illegal movement 
of people and commodities. It is highly likely 
that OCGs will continue to use GA in order 
to facilitate the illegal entry of migrants, in 
particular, into the UK.
General Maritime (GM)
83. The UK, with approximately 11,000 miles 
of coastline and more than 950 ports, 
harbours and marinas, presents challenges 
for UK law enforcement and opportunities 
for OCGs exploiting GM.
84. Our intelligence has increased with regards 
to how criminals use commercial vessels 
to exploit the vulnerabilities in GM. OCGs 
use commercial vessels to facilitate larger 
importations of illicit commodities from 
Europe for onward distribution. 
85. Clandestine	entry	into	the	UK	and	large-
scale drug importations present the greatest 
risk from the abuse of GM. 
Roll-On/Roll-Off (Freight and 
Tourist)
86. The	UK	receives	Roll-On/Roll-Off	traffic	via	
the Eurotunnel and ferry services from 15 
ports across France, Netherlands, Spain and 
Ireland.
87. Roll-On/Roll-Off	is	the	most	common	
method by which OCGs smuggle illicit goods 
and people into the UK. ‘Little and often’ 
methods are commonly employed by OCGs 
to spread the risk of their commodities 
being seized.
88. Whilst there is likely to be little change 
in	the	threats	seen	in	Roll-On/Roll-Off,	
the methods used by OCGs to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of this mode are likely to 
continue to become more sophisticated.
Fast Parcels and Post
89. The volume of shipments transiting the UK 
border via fast parcels and post continues 
to increase, with OCGs concealing illicit 
goods amongst legitimate traffic. In 2017, 
all known seizures of the opioid Fentanyl 
were made via the fast parcel and post 
system. Fast parcels and post also remain 
a significant mode of transport for the 
importation of single firearms.  Firearms 
importations into the UK via fast parcels and 
post are facilitated almost exclusively by 
online purchases. 
90. As with previous years, it is highly likely the 
volume of fast parcels and post traffic will 
continue to increase due to rising consumer 
demand online.
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91. The threat from SOC offenders in prisons 
can be split into two groups: those who 
continue to facilitate SOC in the community 
from	within	prison;	and	those	who	are	
involved in organised crime within the 
prison environment. There can be some 
overlap between the two and their activities 
cut across all the main threat areas. There 
is a notable concentration of SOC offenders 
who are in prison because of drug trafficking 
and other related offences such as use of 
firearms, violence, and money laundering.
92. Some SOC offenders are highly capable, 
well organised individuals with extensive 
supportive networks on the outside. 
SOC	offenders	usually	adopt	a	business-
focused approach to their activities both 
within prison and whilst on licence. They 
exercise pragmatism in their dealings with 
authority in order to minimise impact on 
their	enterprises.	SOC-affiliated	individuals	
are	characterised	by	general	-	if	superficial	
-	compliance	with	rules	and	regulations.	
This means that they can establish a prison 
routine subject to minimal disruption 
whilst maintaining maximum freedom of 
movement and trust from prison staff. 
93. These activities are further facilitated by 
strong ties between affiliated SOC offenders, 
based on common acquisitive interest and 
peripheral affiliations with gangs formed in 
prison that have a reputation for violence. 
Such ties between OCGs and gangs provide 
a pathway for gang members to be drawn 
into OCGs as members, leading to much 
more serious offending. This is one of the 
recognised steps on the pathway into 
organised crime.
Criminal Enablers
94. Mobile phones continue to be a key enabler 
for those in prison involved in SOC. Their 
illicit presence provides SOC offenders with 
the means to continue to play a full role in 
major criminal enterprises on a national and 
international level, virtually unaffected by 
physical confinement.  
95. SOC offenders on the outside often use 
corruption in order to facilitate their 
activities;	this	is	no	different	to	those	
in prison. Corrupt prison officers and 
auxiliary staff assist organised criminals by 
smuggling illicit items into the prison and 
by providing information to key members 
of the OCG, both on the inside and outside 
of prison. The smuggling of mobile phones 
and sim cards into prisons by corrupt staff 
allows SOC offenders to continue their 
operations from inside.
Drug Supply
96. Illegal drug supply within prisons is highly 
lucrative for suppliers, but extremely 
detrimental to the prison population 
and expensive for the state. Intelligence 
suggests that “Spice” is the drug of choice 
within prisons in England and Wales. Spice 
is one of several ‘psychoactive substances’ 
(PS) which are synthetic compounds that 
can cause people to experience enhanced 
sensations	and	damaging	side-effects.	It	
is also associated with increased mental 
health issues, as well as a strong urge to 
redose. 
97. Some PS are available in liquid form which 
can be sprayed onto paper and ingested 
or injected, making it extremely difficult to 
detect when being trafficked into prisons. 
This also presents a significant health risk 
in that it may overlap previously sprayed 
sections meaning the recipient cannot be 
sure of the dosage they are ingesting. PS 
enter	the	prison	estate	via	throw-overs,	
drones, corrupt staff, visits, concealments, 
and even correspondence. 
98. PS trafficking in prisons is linked to higher 
levels of violence (connected to drug debts), 
assaults	on	staff,	and	self-harming.	The	
extent to which the supply of PS in prisons 
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is controlled by organised crime is not fully 
understood. However, because a sprayed 
single	A4-sized	sheet	can	sell	for	upwards	
of £250 in prison, it is unlikely that less 
organised/connected criminals would be 
allowed to operate without the backing of 
organised criminals. 
Cyber-enabled Offending
99. An	emerging	threat	in	prison	is	cyber-
enabled	offending.	Cyber-enabled	crimes	
are not recorded as such and so it is difficult 
to gauge the levels of cyber capability 
in prison. It is assessed that the cyber 
capability of criminals will continue to 
increase in line with that of the general 
population. There is a risk that cyber 
offenders, who tend to be younger than 
the average prisoner, may be exploited by 
serious and organised criminals in prison 
who may recruit them to further their own 
criminal activities. 
CSEA Offenders
100. CSEA offenders are, in many cases, not 
otherwise	criminally-minded	and	are	not	
attempting to gain financially from activities 
whilst	in	custody;	in	this	respect	they	
are unlike other SOC offenders. A recent 
intelligence study of these offenders in 
custody	concluded	that	routine,	low-level	
networking and sharing of items relating 
to	children	such	as	magazine	cut-outs	and	
pictures from library books is occurring. Less 
commonly, electronic images of children 
were noted as having been discovered 
on computers linked to the educational 
intranet. 
101. Whilst evidence of communication and 
facilitation of offending using mobile 
phones was not detected, it has been 
noted	historically	that	prisoner-to-prisoner	
mail, external written communications 
and telephone calls have all been used 
to discuss and in some cases arrange 
further offending. It is likely that this will 
increase as more offenders convicted of 
cyber-enabled	and	cyber-dependent	CSEA	
offences enter the system. We anticipate 
that networking among CSEA offenders with 
cyber capability could result in a greater 
overall	capability	to	conduct	cyber-enabled	
offences.
Criminal Finances within Prison
102. Criminal abuse of finance by prisoners and 
their associates primarily takes the form 
of the exploitation of weaknesses in the 
prison banking system, and by using friends 
and family’s bank accounts either with or 
without their consent. Criminals deliberately 
smuggle illicit items into prison to capitalise 
on inflated commodity values within the 
illicit economy. They also seek to drive other 
prisoners into unserviceable debt in order to 
exercise control over them. 
103. A study of the activities of SOC offenders 
has shown that a business model has 
developed whereby items such as drugs 
(including PS), mobile phones, sim cards, 
and tobacco/associated paraphernalia are 
purchased with the sole intent of smuggling 
them into prisons, where the market value 
can be five to ten times higher, if not more. 
The mark up is further compounded where 
individuals	do	not	manage	their	debts;	a	
prisoner	owing	for	an	item	costing	£5-10	
outside of prison may find themselves 
liable for tens of thousands of pounds of 
debt through punitive interest rates levied 
by lenders in prison. This can lead to 
extortion or exploitation of the prisoner, or 
to attempts at extortion of family members 
through threats and actual violence against 
them or the indebted offender. We judge 
that illicit financial activity among offenders 
is not heavily impacted by incarceration, 
due to the availability of smartphones.
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Rehabilitation and Recividism
104. The ultimate aim of the criminal justice 
system is to rehabilitate offenders who 
have paid their debt to society. This means 
that an offender is introduced to gradually 
increasing levels of freedom along their 
journey to release. However, SOC offenders 
usually have a long history of offending and, 
in spite of the efforts of law enforcement, 
HMPPS, social services, and others, they 
remain resistant to rehabilitation and are 
likely to continue to reoffend. 
105. The full extent of recidivism in England 
and	Wales	-	either	on	probation	or	beyond	
-	requires	further	assessment;	there	are	a	
multitude of examples of SOC offenders 
continuing their activities even whilst still on 
probation. However, one tool which is key 
in the attempt to help prevent reoffending is 
the Serious Crime Prevention Order (SCPO). 
There are currently around 800 SCPOs in 
England and Wales and are an effective and 
cost-efficient	way	of	preventing	ongoing	
offending. SCPOs can be used to identify 
aspects of criminality that may take place 
after an individual has been released from 
prison, which – if present – can be used to 
recall an individual to prison or even lead to 
new sentences.
Corruption within the UK
106. Certain sectors in the UK, such as borders 
and immigration, law enforcement and 
prisons, face a high threat of corruption 
from OCGs. Motivations for corrupt 
behaviour are varied and can include 
financial incentive, loyalty, gratuities or 
threats.
Corruption in UK Police Forces
107. Information is a highly desirable commodity 
for organised criminals. “Tipping off” by law 
enforcement officers provides criminals with 
knowledge of future operational activity, 
search warrant action or upcoming arrests, 
allowing them to plan and undertake tactics 
to counter the law enforcement response. 
Borders and Immigration
108. OCGs use corrupt public and private 
sector workers to facilitate the undetected 
movement of illicit goods and illegal 
immigration into the UK. Investment in 
corrupt insiders is considered by organised 
criminals to be worthwhile in order 
to enable the smooth movement of a 
commodity into the UK. 
109. Corrupt staff that work directly at the 
UK border are able to use their access 
to undermine customs and immigration 
processes.
Corrupt Professionals
110. A small number of individuals in positions 
of	authority	-	such	as	the	accounting	and	
legal services, trust and company service 
providers,	or	in	banking	institutions	-	have	
been identified as corrupt. They have played 
pivotal roles in complex money laundering 
schemes or divulged information to help 
bring credibility to fraudulent schemes. They 
are	also	used	to	assist	corrupt	politically-
exposed persons (PEPs) investing in the UK, 
showing that domestic and international 
corruption are interlinked.
VULNERABILI-
TIES
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Key Vulnerabilities
Threat Crossovers
111. The three threats forming the Vulnerabilities 
‘pillar’ (CSEA, MSHT and OICi) are 
underpinned by the vulnerability of victims 
and the power imbalance between them 
and offenders. Though the offences are 
distinct, the three threats share some 
methodologies, with MSHT particularly seen 
to connect CSEA and OIC.
112. The borders between the three threats are 
permeable, with those who are targeted 
as part of one threat sometimes becoming 
victims of another. Similarly, offenders 
have been identified operating across 
Vulnerability threats.
i ‘People smuggling’ and OIC refer to the facilitated 
illegal movement of people across national borders and 
represents a crime against the State. This is distinct from ‘human 
trafficking’ and MSHT which involve movement or control of 
location, along with forms of exploitation, and is a crime against 
the person.
113. There are shared drivers across the three 
threats, with economic imbalances, 
displacement and mass migration, and 
social factors creating a pool of vulnerable 
people (both domestically and upstream) 
who may be exploited or may seek 
facilitation of migration.
114. Cultural attitudes that diminish willingness 
to report abuse or exploitation, the 
ease of movement across borders, and 
technological facilitators all serve as 
enablers across the Vulnerabilities threats.
115. Though they are largely unlinked 
domestically, looking forward we have 
been unable to identify a plausible scenario 
which would lead to a significant divergence 
between the MSHT and OIC threats 
upstream. We assess that the routes and 
methods are likely to align increasingly in 
the coming three years.
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Child Sexual Exploitation & Abuse
•	 It	is	likely	that	the	lack	of	moderation	and	regulation	on	live-streaming	apps	has	helped	increase	
their popularity among offenders. 
•	 CSEA offenders are likely to adopt encryption, destruction and anonymisation measures in both 
the dark web and mainstream internet in response to law enforcement attempts to apprehend 
them.
•	 The	use	of	end-to-end	encryption	as	standard	in	social	media	apps	means	disguising	CSEA	activity	
will no longer be dependent on offender technological acumen alone.
•	 Educational initiatives will need to be reviewed to reach the most vulnerable children.
•	 Live-streaming	is	a	growing	threat	with	children’s	own	use	of	self-broadcast	live-streaming	apps	
now	being	exploited	by	offenders.	Overseas	live-streaming	business	models	suggest	that	this	area	
could potentially become profitable to OCGs in the future.
•	 Online CSEA continues to generate considerable data presenting resourcing challenges to law 
enforcement. Effective triaging and preventative work is required to identify offenders posing the 
highest risk at the earliest opportunity.
•	 There are distinct offender methodologies, however all target the same high risk factors within 
their victims. Repeat victimisation by multiple offenders or from successive events has been noted 
in both offline and online CSEA. 
•	 There are other motivations besides paedophilic sexual interest behind the commission of 
CSEA. Criminal gangs in niche markets are exploiting the commercial potential of CSEA overseas 
and there are potential for other financial models to become viable. Additionally, sex offenders 
engaging	in	CSEA	as	part	of	other	non-paedophilic	sexual	fetishes	need	to	be	examined	to	obtain	
a full understanding of the threat.
116. The true scale of CSEA remains hidden, 
but we assess that it is greater than that 
recorded in official statistics. Recorded 
sexual offences against children in the 
UK	continue	to	increase	year-on-year	(but	
at a reduced rate) as law enforcement’s 
awareness and proactive focus on CSEA 
increases.
117. Home Office statistics for England 
and Wales show 47,224 sexual crimes 
committed against under 16’s during the 
12 months ending March 2017, excluding 
offences relating to indecent images. This is 
an increase of 15% on the same period the 
previous year. In Northern Ireland, sexual 
offences committed against under 18’si 
between 1 April 2016 and 31 March 2017 
increased by 4% to 1,875 when compared 
to the previous year. In Scotland, sexual 
offences against under 18’s constituted an 
estimated 44% of their total 10,822 sexual 
offences, or 4,762 crimes. This is an increase 
of 8% on the previous year.
i Northern Ireland and Scotland break this data down to under 
18s.
Key Judgements
Assessment of the Threat
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118. The volume of offending is also measurable 
through the data footprint of offenders’ 
online activities.  Referralsii received in 
to the NCA from the National Centre for 
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) 
have increased by 700% over the last four 
years and it is highly likely this will continue 
as the volume of internet data continues to 
grow. 
UK Victims
119. Repeat victimisation is increasingly noted 
by	police	forces	and	Non-Government	
Organisations (NGOs) and occurs in 
targeting by lone offenders, group offending 
and gang activity. Repeat victimisation can 
also occur online. Some victims experience 
multiple grooming events by unlinked 
offenders whereas others are abused by 
multiple offenders in online or real life 
networks.
120. Publicity of negative victim experiences 
when dealing with statutory authorities in 
CSEA is likely to affect victim confidence 
in reporting. Child victims are sometimes 
coming to the attention of law enforcement 
in the first instance for drink, drugs and 
public order offences.
121. The victim profile for children targeted 
by groups (such as in Rotherham 
and Newcastle) identified that 
disproportionately high numbers of victims 
were	looked-after	childreniii. This was 
also the case in similar offending groups 
elsewhere in the country. Placements in 
care homes outside of the local authority 
are persistently being exploited as a result 
of children meeting other grooming victims 
and being introduced to offenders. 
122. Our understanding of the CSEA threat 
picture is impeded by a lack of reporting 
from vulnerable groups, including children 
ii The total number of referrals received includes referrals 
of	non-CSEA	cases	(‘informational’	referrals).	The	average	volume	
of specifically CSEA referrals has increased from 990 per month 
to over 3,000 per month over the last five years.
iii In local authority care.
who are disabled, those questioning 
their sexual identity and from black and 
minority ethnic (BME) communities. There 
is no reason to believe that levels of CSEA 
in these communities are any lower than 
elsewhere. 
Overseas Victims
123. If	offenders	are	embedded	in-country,	
they are better able to exploit victims 
in institutional care, in education 
establishments, charities and/or religious 
groups. Both embedded and transientiv 
offenders target street children who are 
already being sexually exploited.
124. Offenders also target children in 
impoverished families where family 
members or other third parties are willing 
to act as facilitators. In these cases, the 
disparity between the financial position of 
the abuser and the victim/victim’s family is 
a key factor.
Offenders
125. The internet allows for lone offending – 
such as viewing IIOC or sharing comments 
on CSEA offending (including tips on how 
to groom) – to take place in anonymised 
online forums. These forums are sometimes 
referred to as networks, however offline 
contact between these individuals is rare. 
126. Offending by under 18s forms a rising 
proportion of reported CSEA. Reports of 
sexual offences on school premises have 
also	increased.	This	is	separate	from	Self-
Generated Indecent Imagery (SGII).
127. From operational evidence, there are 
observations of extreme fetish interests 
amongst CSE offenders (bestiality, 
iv Embedded offenders are those living in a country, possibly 
specifically for the purposes of offending. Transient offenders 
would travel abroad specifically to offend or incidentally offend 
whilst abroad as a tourist – for instance, by taking advantage 
(or being apathetic as to whether they are taking advantage of) 
children exploited through prostitution.
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‘chemsex’v, sadism and HIV fetishesvi). 
Examinations of the other motivations 
co-observed	with	CSEA	will	increase	our	
understanding	and	our	ability	to	risk-triage	
these offenders.
Transnational Child Sex 
Offenders (TCSOs) 
128. UK TCSOs are highly likely to operate in 
a wider range of countries than official 
data indicates. However, the majority of 
convictions and requests for consular 
assistance from UK nationals arrested 
for sex offences against children abroad 
continue to occur in EU and Anglophone 
countries. This is likely due to their sizeable 
British diaspora, common spoken language 
and reporting mechanisms or proximity to 
the	UK	and	co-ordinated	LE	response	(to	aid	
with detections) rather than them being a 
preferred choice of destination by TCSOs. 
Enablers: Online
129. Anonymisation, encryption and destruction 
tools increasingly prevent the identification 
and prosecution of offenders. Offenders 
use	manipulation	and	rapport-building	to	
increase their influence, either in person 
or via telephone, email and webcam. 
Offenders of all ages use anonymising 
methods, discussing techniques and using 
dark web applications such as The Onion 
Router (Tor) to anonymously exploit the 
internet. 
130. As more of the internet becomes encrypted, 
offenders will be able to achieve anonymity 
simply by using everyday applications, 
rather than requiring any in depth technical 
knowledge. Offenders can use the 
anonymity of the dark web to groom and 
harm children on the mainstream internet. 
v ‘Chemsex’ is the practise of sexual activity whilst under the 
influence of narcotics.
vi Known as ‘toxic chasing’ or ‘bug chasing’.
131. The case of CSEA offender Mathew Falder 
highlighted the damage that can be 
inflicted on victims. Falder had little or 
no clear internet footprint. His offending 
included blackmail, causing or inciting 
a child to engage in sexual activity, 
making and distribution of IIOC, and 
encouragement to rape. His crimes were 
largely accomodated through Darknet 
forums and by routing activity through ToR. 
Exerting his influence on victims through 
blackmail and manipulation, Falder used 
advanced methdologies and anonymisation 
techniques to evade international law 
enforcement efforts to identify him. In the 
course of his activity, he was able to identify 
and target more than 300 victims across the 
world.
132. Falder was first encountered by law 
enforcement after posting under various 
pseudonyms	on	so-called	‘Hurtcore’	sites	
on the dark web. Falder’s eventual arrest 
followed collaboration between UK and 
international	law	enforcement	partners	-	led	
by	the	NCA	-	as	well	as	being	supported	by	
partners in the UK intelligence community. 
He was arrested in June 2017, four years 
after his offending first came to law 
enforcement attention. After pleading guilty 
to 137 separate offences, he was sentenced 
to 32 years imprisonment. The Falder case 
demonstrates the persistence of determined 
offenders in achieving their goals, and the 
levels of harm that can be inflicted remotely 
over the internet. 
133. The take down of Freedom Hosting II by the 
‘Hacktivist’ group ‘Anonymous’, and the 
uncovering of hidden service (HS)vii sites 
dedicated	to	CSEA	-	including	so	called	‘hurt	
core’	-	has	confirmed	the	use	of	the	dark	
web by CSEA offenders to visit specialist 
sites, only accessible via Tor. The majority of 
CSEA remains on the mainstream internet.
vii A Hidden Service is a service which is only accessible via the 
darknet and is hosted on the darknet – most commonly Tor.
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134. Self-Broadcast	live-streaming	is	a	growing	
concern with 1 in 8 teens having broadcast 
on Instagram and 1 in 10 on Facebook, 
and children being coerced and extorted 
into	streaming	Category	A-C	content.	Such	
images can be harvested and redistributed 
leading to blackmail and extortion for 
further	images	by	sexually	and	financially-
motivated offenders, which in turn increases 
the	risk	of	self-harm	and	suicide	by	victims.	
Enablers: Offline
135. The	majority	of	contact	CSEA	is	intra-familial	
or committed by an acquaintance of the 
victim. This has remained a fairly stable 
feature of the CSEA threat.
136. Law enforcement operations and 
independent inquiries continue to identify 
offenders in positions of trust. Holding 
positions of trust remain a common way 
for CSEA offenders to access victims, and 
the use of an institution to abuse children 
remains a popular modus operandi despite 
the access provided by the internet.
137. Group-based	grooming	remains	a	highly	
publicised form of CSEA offending. South 
Asian	offenders	are	over-represented	
for this particular methodology. The 
methodologies are consistent with other 
grooming	models;	acting	as	‘boyfriends’,	
using drugs and alcohol and moving 
victims for the purposes of further sexual 
exploitation.	However,	the	familial	and	inter-
generational links of these offenders and 
the apparent infliction of pain, humiliation 
and degradation on their victims beyond 
that required to force them to comply with 
sexual activity are notable.
Forward Look
138. As access to high speed internet and 
accessible digital technology spreads, there 
is	an	increased	risk	of	in-country	OCGs	
live-streaming	to	UK	offenders	and/or	UK	
offenders using online media to arrange in 
country offending. 
139. It is likely that coercing children to abuse 
other children or produce explicit material 
will remain a preferred method for abusers 
wishing to influence children. Unless 
children and parents are encouraged to 
report when this happens and can be 
confident that coerced children will not be 
criminalised (e.g. due to producing SGII), 
mitigation of this threat is likely to be 
compromised by low victim confidence.
140. There is some evidence of criminal business 
models within CSEA. There is a realistic 
possibility	that	live-streaming,	both	as	an	
extension of overseas sex industries and 
as a way of coercing bespoke imagery from 
children, could encourage OCG involvement 
if sufficient profits can be generated.
141. There has been a reported increase in 
proactive civilian activity against online 
offenders which is expected to continue 
next year. This has been characterised by 
‘Paedophile-Hunter	Groups’	(PHGs),	where	
civilians posing as children online attempt 
to deceive groomers into a meeting and 
then confront them. It remains to be seen 
what extent vigilante activity against sex 
offenders can be said to represent a more 
general civic concern for child safety and 
child protection. In the event that it does, 
concerns about how vigilante activities may 
affect safeguarding of child victims and 
law enforcement evidence collection would 
need to be addressed.
30 Vulnerabilities
Modern Slavery & Human Trafficking
•	 Based on analysis of the drivers of MSHT, we assess that the actual scale of MSHT in the UK is 
continually and gradually increasing and, if drivers remain at their current levels, will continue to 
do so over the next three years. 
•	 An	increasing	proportion	of	potential	victims	are	claiming	exploitation	upstream;	this	is	likely	to	
reflect the growing risks in transit countries, principally in North Africa.
•	 It is highly likely that a large quantity of upstream MSHT offending is carried out by looser, 
unstructured networks collaborating and committing opportunistic exploitation. However, within 
Europe and the UK there is evidence of greater levels of organisation.
•	 Though	technology	is	critical	to	many	forms	of	exploitation,	most	recruitment	still	takes	place	face-
to-face.	The	expected	increase	in	online	recruitment	has	not	materialised,	and	is	judged	unlikely	to	
in the coming year.
•	 Within the UK, Adult Services websites (ASWs) continue to be the most significant enabler of adult 
sexual exploitation. 
142. The term ‘modern slavery’ refers to the 
offences of human trafficking, slavery, 
servitude, and forced or compulsory labour. 
This	can	then	be	considered	as	five	sub-
threats:	the	sexual	exploitation	of	adults;	
the trafficking of adults into conditions of 
labour	exploitation;	the	trafficking	of	adults	
into	conditions	of	criminal	exploitation;	
the trafficking of minors into conditions of 
sexual,	criminal	or	labour	exploitation;	and	
other forms of exploitation. 
143. It is highly likely that numbers of MSHT 
incidents and potential victims identified via 
the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) and 
Duty to Notify (DTN) statistics will continue 
to increase in the coming three years. 
However, it is not possible to determine to 
what extent current increases in numbers 
are due to improved awareness, reporting 
and recording, rather than an increased 
incident rate. 
144. Based on analysis of the drivers of MSHT, 
we assess the actual scale of MSHT in the 
UK is continually and gradually increasing 
and will continue to do so over the next 
three years.
Victimology
145. Potential victims’ vulnerability to MSHT is 
a product of a range of factors including 
geography (proximity to conflict and 
instability), cultural norms and beliefs, 
language, demographics (such as age, 
gender, economic status), and family 
cohesion and stability. Geographic factors 
such as instability and conflict exacerbate 
the situation for already vulnerable people. 
These factors not only affect the source 
countries of vulnerable people, but also 
those that migrants pass through en route 
to the UK or elsewhere.
Key Judgements
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146. UK victims of MSHT are frequently 
vulnerable in terms of homelessness or 
financial difficulties. These also often go 
hand in hand with other factors that further 
exacerbate the situation, such as lack of 
support from their families, mental illness, 
and dependency on drugs or alcohol – 
which also act as means of control. 
147. Exploitation of victims commonly requires 
other criminality in order for the offender 
business model to operate successfully. 
This ranges from financial offences such as 
laundering money to immigration offences 
by	non-EU	potential	victims	arriving	in	the	
UK – such as clandestine entry, presenting 
false travel documents or sham marriage.
Offender Profiles
148. Offenders are most likely to target 
individuals of either their own nationality/
ethnic group or nationalities with close or 
historic links, likely exploiting linguistic, 
national, cultural and ethnic ties in order 
to recruit and control victims. However, 
British national offenders remain the most 
likely to target victims from a broad range of 
national and ethnic origins. 
149. Although most MSHT criminality is carried 
out by male offenders, the proportion of 
female offenders has increased. Female 
offenders are most commonly encountered 
in	cases	of	sexual	exploitation	-	where	they	
can act as ‘madams’ or ‘alphas’ (victims of 
exploitation who become complicit in the 
trafficking/exploitation of others), and in 
domestic servitude.
150. Technology is a key enabler of MSHT. The 
majority of online MSHT offending takes 
place on the mainstream internet, using well 
known and publically accessible websites 
and apps, including ASWs and social media. 
151. There are a number of different models 
for how groups of offenders offend and 
interact. Although we see evidence of 
larger organised crime groups impacting 
on the UK and abroad, a large quantity of 
MSHT offending is carried out by looser, 
unstructured networks which interact and 
collaborate with each other dependent on 
the exploitation type and across different 
stages of MSHT (e.g. transit, recruitment). 
152. Within Europe and the UK there is evidence 
of greater levels of organisation, with 
MSHT	directed	by	over-arching	OCGs,	who	
operate	an	end-to-end	service,	controlling	
the recruitment, transit and exploitation of 
victims. 
Recruitment
153. The promise of a better life underpins the 
majority of recruitment methods used by 
offenders, whether in attracting victims to 
the UK or in targeting vulnerabilities such 
as financial difficulties, substance abuse, 
family breakdown and homelessness in UK 
nationals. 
154. Although some offenders use the internet 
to target, attract or make initial contact with 
potential victims, the majority of recruitment 
still	takes	place	face-to-face.	
155. EU nationals seeking work in the UK are 
at risk of recruitment through bogus UK 
agencies offering employment opportunities 
that are subsequently paid below the 
National Minimum Wage and outside of 
agreed terms. In such cases, potential 
victims are misled in relation to their 
employment and legal status within the UK, 
increasing their vulnerability to exploitation.
156. Irregular migrants arriving in the UK (either 
via facilitation or independent travel) may 
be targeted by offenders, often within their 
diaspora community who exploit victims’ 
vulnerability as a result of their irregular 
status in the UK. 
Transit
157. Offenders often move victims around the 
UK, both accompanied and unaccompanied, 
in order to exploit them. Victims are moved 
using public transport, private vehicles, 
taxis and hire cars.
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158. Victims originating from the EU continue 
to arrive in the UK through both travel 
arranged by offenders and independently. 
Non-EU	victims	travel	to	the	UK	both	
on legitimate documentation and as 
clandestines.
159. Irregular migrants remain vulnerable to 
exploitation en route. Victims are regularly 
placed into debt bondage for their travel 
and exploited at various stages of their 
journey. Migrants travelling through areas of 
instability and conflict are also frequently at 
risk of kidnapping and detention leading to 
sexual and labour exploitation.
Exploitation
160. The	exploitation	of	victims	-	primarily	for	
profit	-	manifests	itself	in	a	number	of	forms,	
with sexual and labour exploitation being 
the most commonly experienced in the UK 
and overseas. 
Labour Exploitation
161. Car washes, construction and factories 
continue to be the largest sectors in which 
labour	exploitation	takes	place;	however,	
identification of exploitation within 
agriculture has increased.
Sexual Exploitation
162. The use of ASWs continues to be the most 
prevalent method for advertising victims 
of sexual exploitation. We continue to see 
the	exploitation	of	victims	through	on-
street prostitution, but the online market 
provides more opportunities for offenders to 
maximise profit.  
Criminal Exploitation
163. Criminal exploitation includes theft, fraud, 
drug distribution and production, however 
the larger portion of identified instances 
relates to the production of cannabis.
164. Where victims are from the UK, some are 
coerced into drug distribution through the 
county lines operating model. Homeless 
and otherwise vulnerable victims are 
targeted and forced to commit thefts on 
behalf of offenders to pay off debts accrued 
through drug use. 
Exploitation of Children
165. Child victims have been identified across all 
exploitation types, although they are most 
commonly reported in cases of child sexual 
exploitation (CSE). Many such cases involve 
UK minors transported short distances 
domestically before being forced to engage 
in sexual activity by an offender they 
consider their boyfriend.
Other Exploitation
166. Due to difficulties identifying potential 
victims and the nature of the crime, victims 
of domestic servitude are highly likely to be 
under-represented	in	estimates	of	potential	
victims.
167. The benefits and credits system is used 
as another revenue stream by offenders, 
who use the identities of those they have 
trafficked to submit claims.  
Control
168. Control of victims is common to all MSHT 
criminal operations and can be present 
at any stage of the process – although 
it is more commonly exerted during the 
exploitation and transit of the victim in order 
to ensure continuous criminal gains. Control 
of victims is maintained through a number 
of different means, including debt bondage, 
physical intimidation and promoting a 
psychological dependency on the offender. 
169. Technology is used in the control of 
victims, with social media and messaging 
platforms used in both the blackmail of 
victims of sexual exploitation through 
threats to release compromising images or 
information and in the extortion of families 
of victims subject to mistreatment and 
exploitation in unstable transit countries.
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Forward Look
170. We assess that in the next three to five years 
it is highly likely that the numbers of global 
victims of MSHT will gradually increase, and 
that this will be mirrored in the UK. There is 
a realistic possibility that the demographics 
of victims and offenders of MSHT in the UK 
will gradually change due to the arrival in 
the UK of migrants displaced by current 
upstream events. In particular, it is likely 
that the numbers of South Sudanese and 
Eritrean victims identified in the UK will 
continue to increase. 
171. We assess that consumer demand for 
services in which MSHT is evidenced (e.g. 
agriculture, construction, car washes) is 
likely to remain high. If this demand were 
combined with continued decreased 
migration from the EU to the UK, and 
the return of EU workers from the UK to 
Europe, it is likely that this would result in a 
change to the demographics of victims and 
offenders, particularly in labour exploitation. 
Both irregular migrants and vulnerable UK 
nationals would likely be at greater risk of 
exploitation. 
172. Any reduced access to victims as a result 
of decreased numbers of vulnerable 
EU migrants is likely to see offenders 
use increasingly coercive methods of 
recruitment and control as the most easily 
available victim pool reduces.
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Organised Immigration Crime
•	 The nature of people smuggling is subject to regular change caused by political and legal 
developments in source, transit and destination countries as well as high impact events such as 
humanitarian crises. 
•	 Smuggling methods frequently involve significant physical and mental suffering to the migrants 
involved.	However,	certain	methods	require	special	attention	due	to	their	life-endangering	nature	
where victims are at high risk of hypothermia, exposure, suffocation and drowning.
•	 The closure of the Calais and Dunkirk migrant camps has reduced the opportunities for 
opportunistic attempts to enter the UK via the juxtaposed controls, but has had little impact on 
overall	levels	of	OCG-facilitated	migration	from	the	near	Continent.	With	the	current	decline	in	
opportunist clandestine migrant detections in the near Continent, we assess a greater proportion 
of	clandestine	detections	to	be	OCG-facilitated.
•	 The implementation of agreements between the EU or EU states and transit countries have caused 
bottlenecks where migrants are trapped. This could cause the displacement of people smuggling 
routes or humanitarian concerns. 
Clandestine Entry (Near Europe)
173. The closure of the Calais and Dunkirk camps 
and enhanced cooperation by French and 
UK authorities have made northern France a 
more hostile environment for OCGs. 
174. The nationalities of clandestine migrants 
detected by UK authorities in 2017 remained 
largely the same as 2016. Belgium has 
become a location of greater focus for the 
activities of organised people smugglers in 
the past year where smugglers of various 
nationalities operate. The number of 
smugglers located there increased after the 
closure of the migrant camp at Dunkirk in 
March 2017. 
175. The closure of the camps at Calais and 
Dunkirk has made it more likely that 
migrants who are still determined to 
reach the UK will turn to organised crime 
groups as the options for opportunist 
illegal migration are reduced. Intelligence 
indicates that some migrants are returning 
to the Dunkirk and Calais areas with small 
impromptu camps emerging where migrants 
can contact facilitators, but it is not clear 
what effect this will have on organised 
people smuggling. 
176. People smugglers continue to favour hard 
sided refrigerated lorries to transport 
migrants to the UK. They also attempt to 
smuggle migrants in concealments in vans. 
Opportunist migrants attempt entry in 
soft-sided	vehicles.	These	preferences	are	
reflective of the capabilities of each group.
177. A	recent	NCA	operation	disrupted	a	cross-
continental	Iraqi-Kurd	people	smuggling	
OCG which was based in the north east of 
England. The OCG was capable of providing 
an	end-to-end	service	from	Iraq	to	the	UK,	
including travel within the EU and across the 
Channel using complicit lorry drivers and 
constructed concealments. The migrants 
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would	be	dropped	off	at	pre-arranged	
times and places in the UK for collection. 
Payments were made using ‘hawala’ (and 
other similar) providers.
178. The large transportation capability of this 
OCG made the disruption of it significant: 
the group had the capacity to transport 
hundreds of migrants into the UK 
illegally. The case also demonstrates the 
effectiveness	of	cross-agency	cooperation,	
both with UK agencies/forces and partners 
in Belgium, France and the Netherlands.
Clandestine People Smuggling
179. Large-scale	maritime	people	smuggling	
to the EU in the Mediterranean region 
continued into 2017. The overall figures 
were	lower	than	in	2015-16,	largely	because	
the flow of migrants through the Eastern 
Mediterranean, specifically by sea from 
Turkey to Greece, has greatly reduced. 
The main reduction occurred following the 
closure of borders in the Balkans and the 
EU-Turkey	deal	in	March	2016,	and	has	
also been affected by increased security on 
Turkey’s eastern borders.
180. People smuggling in the Central 
Mediterranean was severely disrupted from 
July 2017 due largely to fighting between 
militia groups in and around the Libyan 
coastal town of Sabratha. 
181. The mistreatment of migrants in Libya, or 
on their way there, appears to have become 
systematic to the point of becoming part 
of the people smugglers’ business model. 
Migrants are frequently robbed, or detained 
in camps and extorted, with their relatives 
being threatened with the migrant being 
imprisoned, tortured or killed. Mistreatment 
has included torture, rape, and murder, with 
some migrants coerced into forced labour or 
prostitution. 
182. The financial aspects of people smuggling 
comprise a number of elements including 
migrant payments, the consolidation 
and transmission of funds, investment 
and protection of criminal assets, people 
smuggling logistics, and predatory activities. 
Hawala (and other similar service providers) 
and money transfer services are popular 
in source and transit countries for irregular 
migration and often feature in people 
smuggling finances.
Air Facilitation
183. Air facilitated migration remains a major 
threat to the integrity of the UK border, 
although there are far fewer detections of 
irregular migrants arriving in the UK via this 
method than is the case with clandestine 
entry. Air facilitated migration is necessarily 
more reliant on OCGs than clandestine 
migration: a clear route (and potentially 
false, fraudulently obtained, or illegally 
modified documents) would be required to 
enter the UK in this way, thus increasing the 
cost and limiting the likely market.
False Documents
184. False identity documents remain a key 
enabler of OIC with counterfeit, forged or 
fraudulently obtained documents regularly 
detected at the UK border. 
Abuse of Legitimate Entry and 
Leave to Remain
185. Abuse of legitimate routes of entry 
continues to be a major threat, evidenced 
through asylum and human rights claims 
after arrival and detections of migrants 
working in breach of their visa conditions or 
overstaying their leave. Facilitation by OCGs 
and other facilitators (including overseas 
travel	agents,	visa	agents	and	UK-based	
immigration representatives) continues to 
be the key enabler for migrants attempting 
visa fraud. Most migrants facilitated this 
way intend to remain in the UK indefinitely.
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186. There has been a reduction in the overall 
number of migrants attempting to 
fraudulently obtain legitimate leave to enter 
or remain in the UK using deception. This is 
attributed to the tightening of immigration 
rules, improved entry clearance decision 
making, and the revocation of the sponsor 
licences of many abusive sponsors.
Forward Look
187. OCGs facilitating illegal migrants will 
continue to be an issue for the UK. The 
hotspots both in the near Europe area and 
further upstream are unlikely to change in 
the next 12 months. However, we assess 
that single events have the potential 
to radically shift patterns of migration 
upstream. 
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Money Laundering
•	 There is no reliable estimate of the total value of laundered funds that impacts on the UK. 
However, given the volume of financial transactions transiting the UK, there is a realistic possibility 
the scale of money laundering impacting the UK annually is in the hundreds of billions of pounds. 
•	 The ease with which UK companies can be opened, and the appearance of legitimacy that they 
provide, means they are used extensively to launder money derived both from criminal activity in 
the UK and from overseas. 
•	 Criminal exploitation of accounting and legal professionals, particularly those involved with trust 
and company service provision, continues to pose a significant threat.
•	 Money laundering through the capital markets is an evolving threat.
•	 Trade based money laundering (TBML) is a complex global issue and a key method of money 
laundering impacting on the UK. 
•	 A small but growing number of criminals are laundering money using cryptocurrencies. 
188. There is no reliable estimate of the total 
value of laundered funds that impacts 
on the UK. However, given the volume of 
financial transactions transiting the UK, 
there is a realistic possibility the scale 
of money laundering impacting the UK 
annually is in the hundreds of billions of 
pounds. 
189. The UK’s large, open financial sector is a 
global centre for legitimate business. This is 
also attractive to money launderers because 
of the plethora of professional services and 
the complex and varied ways available to 
launder money. Although the majority of 
financial services and professional providers 
are not criminally complicit or negligent 
with regards to money laundering, these 
are areas of high risk and remain crucial 
enablers for disguising the origins of funds. 
190. Law enforcement agencies are more 
frequently observing criminal funds 
progressing from lower level laundering 
being accumulated into larger sums to be 
sent overseas through more sophisticated 
methods, including retail banking and 
money transmission services. 
191. The risk to regulated sectors from money 
laundering is heightened when interacting 
with the unregulated sector, where similar 
money laundering risks exist from a lack of 
due diligence and awareness.  
192. The overseas jurisdictions that have the 
most enduring impact on the UK across the 
majority of the different money laundering 
threats are: Russia, China, Hong Kong, 
Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). Some of these jurisdictions have 
large financial sectors which also make 
them attractive as destinations or transit 
points for the proceeds of crime.
Key Judgements
Assessment of the Threat
39Prosperity
High-End Money Laundering 
(HEML)
193. HEMLi using corporate structures and 
financial markets to launder billions of 
pounds of illicit funds, continues to come 
to the attention of law enforcement and 
regulators. 
194. HEML is facilitated by the abuse of 
legitimate processes and services. UK 
corporate entities, such as Limited Liability 
Partnerships (LLPs) and Scottish Liability 
Partnerships (SLPs), have been specifically 
set up and exploited by UK and overseas 
criminals to facilitate money laundering. 
195. In 2016, to make beneficial ownership more 
transparent, the UK introduced the People 
with Significant Control (PSC) registration 
requirements for UK companies. In 2017, 
each UK Overseas Territory and Crown 
Dependency was required to establish, 
where one did not already exist, a 
centralised register or platform of beneficial 
ownershipii. It is too early to judge the 
impact of the registers.
Capital Markets
196. The aspects of London’s capital markets 
that make them successful for legitimate 
business are also attractive to criminal 
enterprises including international money 
launderers. The sheer scale of trading 
is a vulnerability, challenging relevant 
firms (including banks, brokerages and 
investment management firms) and 
regulators to identify instances of money 
laundering.
i High end money laundering (HEML) is defined as the 
laundering of large amounts of illicit funds through the financial 
and professional services sectors. It exploits the global nature of 
the financial system, often transferring funds through complex 
corporate vehicles and offshore jurisdictions.
ii All British Overseas Territories with financial centres and 
Crown Dependencies now maintain registers of beneficial 
ownership (name, address, DoB, nationality) of which requests 
can be made by anyone in law enforcement. This information is 
shared under standards agreed in the Exchange of Notes signed 
in 2016.
FX Trading and ABPs
197. The threat of criminals abusing foreign 
exchange (FX) services for money 
laundering remains. HMRC have introduced 
a new registration system to better 
identify those FX businesses under its 
supervision. The new registration process 
differentiates the financial services provided 
by businesses and, as a result, HMRC’s 
understanding of the sector will increase. 
198. Some criminals are using Alternative 
Banking Platforms (ABPs)iii to launder 
money whilst avoiding scrutiny from the 
regulators. 
Property Markets 
199. Criminals continue to purchase property 
in the UK, in particular within the London 
super-prime	property	market,	through	
companies and trusts. It is legal to use 
a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to buy 
property;	this	is	a	commonly	used	method	
to reduce the level of tax owed, however like 
many areas of the legitimate business world 
it is open to abuse. 
Professional Enablers
200. Professional enablers (PEs) can be 
complicit, negligent or unwitting but are 
key facilitators in the money laundering 
process and often crucial in integrating 
illicit funds into the UK and global banking 
systems. Some types of money laundering, 
and in some instances the predicate offence 
e.g. fraud, necessitate the services of 
professionals, who may not necessarily be 
complicit in the criminality. 
201. The criminal exploitation of accounting 
and legal professionals, particularly those 
involved with trust and company service 
provision, poses the greatest money 
laundering threat, as these professionals 
iii ABPs are a form of shadow banking that uses bespoke 
software to provide online banking services without the regulated 
and auditable assurance. Accounts can be accessed from 
anywhere in the world. They are an effective way of transferring 
ownership of money to multiple individuals within a single 
regulated bank account, without the transfers being reflected in 
traditional banking transactions.
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are used to set up corporate structures 
which	are	often	key	enablers	in	high-end	
money laundering. Corrupt individuals 
inside financial institutions also pose a 
threat. 
Trade-Based Money Laundering 
(TBML)
202. TBML is a complex global issue shared by 
and	affecting	jurisdictions	across	the	world;	
criminals engaged in TBML take advantage 
of the jurisdictions’ varying standards and 
regulations. 
203. Almost any kind of goods, service or sector 
can be used for TBML. Criminal funds from 
known jurisdictions of money laundering 
risk, including jurisdictions with a high 
risk of bribery and corruption, are being 
invested in UK businesses. Businesses 
dealing in high value items, such as gems 
and precious metals, have been complicit in 
laundering criminal funds, masking criminal 
monies with the business’ naturally high 
turnover.
International Controllers
204. International controller networks continue 
to be used by UK criminals to move cash 
and value. Controllers based overseas 
coordinate collectors in the UK and across 
the globe using satellite networks. 
205. International controllers make use of a 
number of methodologies to transmit 
value including cash smuggling, MSBs, 
TBML, third party UK bank accounts and 
bank accounts held in the name of front 
companies.
Cash
206. Cash is a frequently used tool in money 
laundering, offering anonymity and 
providing a break in the audit trail at any 
stage of the laundering process. Cash 
intensive businesses, such as scrap metal 
wholesalers, nail bars and takeaways, and 
some firms in the regulated sector (e.g. 
MSBs), continue to be used to disguise illicit 
money. 
207. As UK banks and financial institutions 
continue	to	de-risk	business,	including	the	
remittance industry, it is likely that criminals 
will increasingly use other methods to move 
illicit funds.
208. Money laundering from cash being 
smuggled	by	air	passengers	and	Ro-Roiv 
traffic remains a significant threat. Some 
OCGs use sophisticated concealment 
methods to move cash across borders, 
whilst others make no attempt to hide their 
cash. Cash is seized from air passengers 
frequently journeying to known jurisdictions 
of risk for money laundering and other 
criminality. 
Forward Look
209. As the UK moves towards exiting the EU 
in March 2019, UK based businesses will 
almost certainly look to increase the amount 
of	trade	they	have	with	non-EU	countries.	
We judge this will increase opportunities for 
criminals to carry out TBML. 
210. We assess that criminals will increasingly 
use cryptocurrencies to move illicit 
funds across borders. The value of 
cryptocurrencies is significantly volatile, but 
their	relatively	high	price	(of	Bitcoin	-	BTC	
-	in	particular)	makes	it	easier	to	transfer	
large amounts of fiat currenciesv in smaller 
volumes of cryptocurrencies.
211. The UK will start to introduce Unexplained 
Wealth Orders (UWOs)vi in 2018. The effect 
this will have on the UK being viewed 
as a safe place to launder illicit funds is 
likely to depend on the amount of assets 
successfully recovered as a result of UWOs. 
In many cases the assets may have to be 
recovered through civil litigation under the 
Proceeds of Crime Act.
iv	 Roll-on/Roll-off.	Vehicles	transported	by	ships	at	UK	ports.
v ‘Fiat currencies’ are those which governments have 
delcared to be legal tender but are not backed by a commodity 
(e.g. gold). Fiat currency (also known as ‘real money’) examples 
are US dollars and GB pound sterling.
vi Unexplained Wealth Orders were a key element of the 
Criminal Finances Act which received Royal Assent in April 2017.
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Fraud and Other Economic Crime
•	 Fraud is the most commonly experienced crime in the UK. The Crime Survey of England and Wales 
2017 indicated that there were 3.4 million incidents of fraud in the financial year ending March 
2017. 
•	 Our	understanding	of	fraud	in	the	UK	is	hampered	by	under-reporting;	less	than	20%	of	incidents	
are reported to the police. 
•	 Data breaches continue to be a key enabler of fraud. Personal and financial information obtained 
in a breach can be used to commit frauds affecting individuals, the private and public sector.
212. Fraud continues to be the most commonly 
experienced crime in the UK and the Crime 
Survey of England and Wales indicates that 
there were 3.4 million incidents of fraud in 
the financial year ending March 2017. The 
2017 Annual Fraud Indicator (AFI) estimates 
that fraud costs the UK economy £190 
billion per year with the private sector being 
the worst affected with an estimated loss 
of £140 billion. The public sector could be 
losing £40.4 billion per year and individuals 
£6.8 billion per year. 
213. Our understanding of fraud in the UK is 
seriously	hampered	by	under-reporting	with	
less than 20% of incidents believed to be 
reported to the police. Most fraud in the 
private	sector	is	believed	to	go	un-reported	
as businesses are concerned about the 
adverse publicity or may simply not be 
aware of the fraud. The harm is not just 
financial;	some	frauds	against	the	individual	
can cause significant psychological 
damage.
214. Large-scale	data	breaches	have	continued	
to be reported during 2017 along with more 
frequent lower level attacks. Information 
from data breaches is sold via online 
marketplaces with cryptocurrencies being 
the preferred method of payment. 
215. Some investment frauds and the majority of 
computer software service fraud are known 
to be perpetrated from overseas. 
Fraud against the Individual and 
Private Sector
216. Analysis of all data sets submitted to 
National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) 
indicates that the most commonly reported 
frauds in the six months ending September 
2017 were cheque, plastic card and online 
banking frauds, application fraud (exc. 
mortgages), online shopping frauds and 
advanced fee frauds. Organised crime 
groups have been identified conducting 
these fraud types and we judge that a 
significant proportion of these frauds 
are likely to be conducted by groups or 
networks. 
217. Business email attacks used to conduct 
mandate fraudi, CEO fraudii and 
i Mandate fraud is where fraudsters obtain details of direct 
debits, standing orders or account transfer details and amend 
them to transfer monies to other accounts.
ii CEO fraud is where a member of an organisation receives 
correspondence from someone purporting to be a senior member 
of the same organisation requesting for a payment to be made 
from the business bank account.
Key Judgements
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conveyancing fraudiii are increasingly one of 
the major reported fraud threats facing UK 
businesses. They use phishing emails as a 
means to compromise customers’ security 
and personal details and gain access to 
email accounts. 
218. Cyber-enabled	crimes	are	becoming	
increasingly complex with fraudsters 
using more sophisticated techniques to 
target victims. The rise in impersonation 
and deception frauds, where a criminal 
approaches a customer purporting to 
be from a legitimate organisation, is an 
increasing concern. When fraud involves 
multiple victims there is highly likely to be a 
network behind the crime. 
Fraud against the Public Sector
Fraud against the UK tax system
219. Organised crime groups undertake 
coordinated and systematic attacks on 
the tax system. Losses related to tobacco 
fraud are the highest with an estimated 
£2.4 billion lost in 2015/16, while alcohol 
fraud led to an estimated loss of £1.3 billion. 
Missing	Trader	Intra-Community	(MTIC)	
fraud, an aggressive and organised VAT 
fraud	that	costs	£0.5-1	billion	per	year	is	
also a significant threat. It is conducted 
through contrived trading chains and can 
involve any commodity which is liable to 
VAT. 
220. Other current threats include labour fraud 
in construction (fraudsters infiltrating the 
construction sector and using contrived 
chains of subcontractors to avoid the 
payment of VAT and direct taxes to HMRC 
on large construction projects) and payroll 
company fraud (organised criminals 
taking on the role of an outsourced payroll 
provider to complicit or unwitting genuine 
businesses and not paying employees or 
remitting taxes to HMRC. 
iii Conveyancing fraud is where a conveyancer or their client 
involved in the buying/selling of a property receives an email 
purporting to be from the other party confirming a change to 
bank details into which any monies should be paid.
Fraud against the UK benefit and tax 
credits system 
221. The Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) final estimates show that the total 
monetary value of fraud in the benefit 
system in 2016/17 was £2 billion, or 1.2% of 
total benefit expenditure. This represents a 
slight increase on the previous year. It still 
remains difficult to estimate how much of 
this is opportunist fraud and how much is 
carried out by organised criminals. 
Fraud against other areas of the public 
sector
222. Fraud against other central government 
departments, outside of DWP and HMRC, 
is less well understood. Government 
departments have improved their reporting 
mechanisms with total detected fraud 
increasing from £29.7 million in 2014/15 to 
£73.6 million in 2015/16. This is likely to be 
the tip of the iceberg with the NHS alone 
estimating that fraud cost at least £1.25 
billion in 2015/16.
Market Abuse
223. The FCA broadly defines three types of 
behaviour as market abuse: the misuse 
of	inside	information;	the	manipulation	
of	markets;	and	the	issuing	of	misleading	
statements. The challenges in distinguishing 
trading based on inside information or 
trading that is manipulative from the large 
volume of legitimate trading undertaken 
each day is complex, highly technical work 
which makes it difficult to quantify the 
overall scale of market abuse, although its 
prevalence in UK markets is not considered 
to be out of line with other major financial 
centres. 
224. As well as cases involving traditional insider 
dealing and market manipulation activity, 
we continue to see examples (mainly in the 
US)	where	market-sensitive	information	
has	been	stolen	by	cyber	criminals	-	a	
practice known as ‘outsider trading’ 
because it negates the need for a human 
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insider. Historically, the main targets have 
been financial and legal firms but several 
recent attacks suggest that this threat is 
diversifying to other sectors which may 
be less experienced and/or effective at 
protecting the sensitive information they 
hold. The use of the internet to disseminate 
misleading information about companies 
also appears to be a developing market 
abuse threat in major financial centres 
across the world.
Counterfeit Currency
225. Organised crime groups based in the UK 
continue to be involved in the counterfeiting 
of Bank of England £20 notes. Both 
Scottish and Northern Irish notes have also 
been targeted. Bank of England notes are 
most at risk in terms of the total volume 
of counterfeits. Scottish and Northern 
Irish notes are most at risk in terms of 
vulnerability & relative volume.
226. The new style £1 coin and polymer £10 
notes that have been issued during 2017 
have increased security features.
Forward Look
227. It is highly likely that reporting of fraud will 
continue to show a steady rise over the next 
12 months. The continued push for easily 
accessible online services will continue to 
provide opportunities for fraudsters. Large 
organised networks will continue to target 
UK victims constantly adapting or changing 
their methodologies to deceive their victims. 
228. The large data breaches in 2017 will fuel 
an increase in fraud in 2018, however the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
will apply in the UK from May 2018 and will 
introduce significant fines for businesses 
that suffer data breaches due to inadequate 
protective measures. The intention is this 
will make businesses more responsible 
with the personal data they hold eventually 
leading to a reduction in the instances of 
data breaches.
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International Bribery, Corruption & 
Sanctions Evasion
•	 The UK remains a prime destination for foreign corrupt Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) to invest 
in. Russia, Nigeria and Pakistan are the most commonly seen source countries for PEPs investing 
in the UK.
•	 Some UK registered companies pay bribes overseas in order to conduct business. 
•	 The ease of opening UK companies means they are used frequently to enable corrupt activity. 
Companies based in British Overseas Territories are also used both to disguise ownership and to 
conceal corrupt payments.
Corrupt Politically-Exposed 
Persons
229. The UK is a prime destination for foreign 
corrupt PEPs to launder the proceeds of 
corruption. Investment in UK property, 
particularly in London, continues to be an 
attractive mechanism to launder funds. The 
true scale of PEPs investment in the UK is 
not known, however the source countries 
that are most commonly seen are Russia, 
Nigeria and Pakistan. 
230. Companies registered in British Overseas 
Territories and other offshore jurisdictions 
offering secrecy and low taxes continue 
to be used to disguise ultimate beneficial 
ownership of UK based assets owned by 
corrupt PEPs. The use of accounts in family 
members’ names is also a common method 
to launder corrupt funds. UK property is 
also used to move money, either for the 
purposes of money laundering or bribery. 
231. A	small	number	of	UK-based	professional	
enablers (solicitors, accountants, estate 
agents and trust and company service 
providers) continue to assist corrupt 
PEPs to invest in the UK. In the majority 
of instances professional enablers are 
complicit although some may be unwitting 
or negligent.
232. Regime change in developing countries 
may appear to bring opportunities to work 
with new governments, but where the 
underlying infrastructure relies on bribery 
and corruption to function efficiently, 
similar problems remain and incoming 
governments become susceptible to 
corruption.
International Bribery
233. UK registered companies continue to 
bribe overseas to improperly secure new 
business, extend existing contracts or 
to obtain sensitive information about 
competitors. As well as being a crime in its 
own right bribery can lead to other societal 
harms, for example, bribes paid to secure a 
contract	using	sub-standard	material	could	
have health and safety consequences. 
234. Intermediaries, or ‘agents’, remain the most 
common method through which UK entities 
pay bribes overseas. It is assessed that 
Key Judgements
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some intermediaries wield significant power 
and influence in a region such that their 
role is greater than simply facilitating bribe 
payments. 
Sanctions Evasion
235. Sanctions evasion undermines foreign 
policy objectives and poses a significant risk 
to the UK’s reputation. The scale of financial 
sanctions breaches is unknown however the 
expanded use of high profile international 
sanctions, strongly backed by the UK, 
against regimes such as the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), has 
increased the risk to the UK of sanctions 
evasion. 
Forward Look
236. As the UK moves towards exiting the EU in 
March	2019,	UK-based	businesses	may	look	
to increase the amount of trade they have 
with	non-EU	countries.	We	judge	this	will	
increase the likelihood that UK businesses 
will come into contact with corrupt markets, 
particularly in the developing world, raising 
the risk they will be drawn into corrupt 
practices.
237. To meet the UK’s future sanctions 
obligations, new legislation is being 
prepared before the UK leaves the EU. The 
public and private sector in the UK will have 
to incorporate any new requirements that 
this legislation brings.
46 Prosperity
Cyber Crime
•	 UK cyber crime continues to rise in scale and complexity. 2017 witnessed a significant expansion 
in the visibility of cyber crime. High profile attacks such as the WannaCry ransomware campaign, 
which impacted heavily on UK NHS services, emphasised the real world harms resulting from such 
attacks, including impact on collateral victims. 
•	 The distinction between nation states and criminal groups in terms of cyber crime is becoming 
frequently more blurred, making attribution of cyber attacks increasingly difficult.
•	 Cyber	crime	groups,	many	of	which	operate	internationally	and	are	Russian-speaking,	continue	to	
pose	a	threat	to	UK	interests.	International	groups	are	behind	high	impact	attacks	by	credential-
stealing malware and many of the most damaging confrontational malware variants. The threat 
from UK domestic cyber criminals continues to mature, and these domestic actors are capable of 
damaging attacks.
•	 The technical capabilities of malware have evolved, increasing the impact and threat posed 
by	these	criminal	tools.	Criminals,	however,	continue	to	exploit	long-standing	and	well-known	
vulnerabilities in victim infrastructure. 
•	 Under-reporting	of	data	breaches	continues	to	erode	our	ability	to	make	robust	assessment	of	the	
scale and cost of network intrusions. Many companies are not disclosing data breaches, putting 
victims at risk. 
238. Indicators of the scale and complexity of UK 
cyber crime point to a continued rise, with 
2017 witnessing a significant expansion in 
the visibility of cyber crime through high 
profile ransomware campaigns. 
239. Under-reporting	of	cyber	crime	is	a	
continuing problem. Just 38% of people in a 
survey said they had confidence in the law 
enforcement	response	to	cyber-dependent	
crime. Those that do report may on occasion 
not be prepared to support prosecution, 
hampering the ability of law enforcement to 
act.
240. Recent case examples have highlighted the 
wide variation in sentencing for Computer 
Misuse Act (CMA) offences. Whilst courts 
acknowledge the seriousness of the 
crimes committed, the level of sentence 
passed does not necessarily reflect this 
seriousness, and can appear low. As many 
convictions are under the Fraud Act rather 
than the CMA, this compounds the problem 
and furthers the perception of ‘cyber crime 
without consequence’.
Victimology
241. 2017 saw cyber crime financially 
disadvantage and cause tangible disruption 
to the UK public and commerce. The Equifax 
breach leaked personal data of around 
700,000 UK victims, failing customers and 
placing victims at risk of frauds. WannaCry, 
meanwhile, had a tangible impact on 
the operation of the NHS, forcing some 
hospitals to divert ambulances and cancel 
operations.
Key Judgements
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242. Our 2017 assessments noted the changing 
tactics of cyber criminals, increasingly 
targeting businesses over individuals 
and we continue to see this. Additionally, 
the WannaCry and NotPetya ransomware 
campaigns have highlighted the risk of 
falling victim as collateral damage to 
attacks primarily targeted elsewhere. 
Whilst the NotPetya campaign focussed on 
Ukraine, significant victims in the UK and 
other countries were impacted, with costs 
to those victims reported to run to between 
US$200–300 million.
243. Businesses in the supply chain are a 
noteworthy victim type. A software update 
for CCleaner, a popular software utility, was 
hijacked with malicious code. The reason 
CCleaner was targeted for attack appears to 
be its role as a trusted third party for larger 
companies, making it especially effective as 
a Trojan horse. 
244. Even an organisation that has invested 
heavily in defending its own networks can 
still be vulnerable to a compromise of its 
third party suppliers. Moreover, from a 
criminal perspective, attacking through 
compromise of a third party product opens 
up a wider range of potential victims, as all 
users of the compromised services can be 
impacted. Those impacted organisations 
need not have been intended as victims by 
the criminals, but become collateral victims.
Criminals
245. The	UK-based	cyber	threat	is	diverse	and	
ranges	from	internationally-connected	
OCGs to individuals (often teenagers, who 
only	have	low-level	technology	at	their	
disposal, but nevertheless are capable of 
causing	critical	national	incidents	-	e.g.	
the 2016 Mirai botnet attacks on the UK 
banking industry). Such individuals can 
have relatively limited knowledge, but 
have ready access to forums from which 
to learn methodologies. They are unlikely 
to have been involved previously in other 
crime and in many cases are not driven by 
financial reward, but rather the acquisition 
of reputational kudos amongst their peers.
246. Our	understanding	of	UK-based	criminals	
has developed and intelligence now points 
to organised cyber crime groups operating 
in the UK that communicate directly with 
international criminal groups behind the 
most impactful malware strains. These 
UK groups are themselves capable of 
significant international disruption, and 
appear to be motivated by profit. 
247. Different OCGs have been seen deploying 
the same malware. In some cases this is 
because	the	malware	is	available	as-a-
service and traded online, but in others the 
reasoning for shared use is an intelligence 
gap.
Criminality
Financial Trojans
248. The most prolific banking Trojans impacting 
on the UK in this period have been Dridex, 
Carbanak, Trickbot and Emotet. The 
emergence of two relatively new financial 
Trojans (Trickbot and Emotet, both of which 
emerged as significant threats in 2017) 
is	unusual;	the	technical	complexity	and	
costs of developing malware of this type 
makes them difficult to bring to market. The 
emergence of Trickbot and Emotet so close 
together in time is likely to be an anomaly 
rather than indicative of a fundamentally 
broadening criminal marketplace. 
Network Intrusion
249. Network intrusion remains a key threat and 
represented the most reported category of 
cyber crime incidents directly into the NCA. 
A general increase in scale is becoming 
apparent: 2017 saw the full extent of the 
2013 Yahoo breach disclosed when Yahoo 
confirmed that the network intrusion 
exposed information related to one billion 
accounts, making it the largest ever to 
be disclosed. The largest breach of 2017 
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occurred in May when credit monitoring 
agency Equifax experienced a breach of 
records of around 700,000 UK residents, 
with around 29,000 having their driving 
licence details stolen. 
Ransomware
250. Action Fraud observed ransomware 
continuing as the main threat facing the UK 
public. In 2017 we assessed it likely that 
the number of new strains would plateau, 
but industry figures indicate growth in new 
strains continues. 
251. The WannaCry ransomware infections in 
May 2017 were a watershed moment for the 
perception of the ransomware threat. The 
most high profile UK impact was on the NHS 
services	and	treatment	plans.	Also,	small-
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) were 
heavily impacted by WannaCry, with many 
saying it took weeks to return to normal. 
NotPetya attacks in June, though not strictly 
ransomware, further highlighted the threat. 
DDoS Attacks
252. After dipping somewhat earlier in 2017, 
the volume of DDoS (including DDoS 
for extortion) incidents reported both 
formally as a crime and through the NCSCi 
and NCA industry engagement channels 
have increased markedly through the 
second half of 2017. The severity of DDoS 
is also increasing with an industry survey 
suggesting that large DDoS attacks of over 
50 Gbps have quadrupled between 2015 
and 2017, with an increasing number of 
companies reporting attacks over 1 Tbps. 
253. ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) devices represent 
the greatest emerging botnet threat. The 
Mirai botnet, in 2016, delivered one of the 
largest DDoS attacks ever witnessed. The 
Mirai malware has since been overtaken by 
the Hajime malware, which has amassed 
a compromised network of devices much 
larger than even Mirai at its peak. 
i	 National	Cyber	Security	Centre	-	a	part	of	GCHQ
Exploits
254. Cyber criminals have increasingly 
incorporated existing exploits into their 
malware in this period. In April 2017 the 
OCG known as ‘Shadow Brokers’ released 
onto the open Internet the ‘EternalBlue’ 
exploit (amongst others) that in May was 
used to facilitate the widespread WannaCry 
ransomware infections. This illustrated 
clearly the threat of exploits being provided 
as-a-service.	
Exploit Kits
255. There has been a significant downturn in the 
exploit kit market, with very few new exploit 
kits emerging. A number of factors are likely 
to have contributed to the decline of exploit 
kits, including the diminished availability 
of suitable browser exploits. Exploit kits, 
however, remain a potent tool for cyber 
criminals, and even rudimentary ones still 
represent a threat, especially if security 
updates are not regularly applied.
Botnets
256. Botnets are noteworthy for the longstanding 
threat they have posed for DDoS attacks 
and the delivery of malware. In the past few 
years, where other delivery mechanisms 
-	such	as	exploit	kits	–	were	disrupted,	
a correlated uptick in spam activity from 
botnets would be seen. This suggests that 
criminals view them as a safe and reliable 
backup.
257. Necurs continues as the largest active spam 
botnet, delivering a range of payloads. With 
over 1 million active bots online at any given 
time, it plays a pivotal role in the delivery of 
malware worldwide. The botnet has been 
used to launch spam campaigns containing  
credential-stealing	malware,	as	well	as	
ransomware variants. Necurs also has the 
capability to launch DDoS attacks. 
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Social Engineering
258. Social engineering as a facilitator of cyber 
crime	continues	to	be	used	by	both	low-
skilled	cyber-enabled	fraudsters	and	
highly technically skilled cyber criminals. 
Criminals have addressed some of the 
previous weaknesses in their social 
engineering campaigns – we can no longer 
rely on criminals making the types of 
basic mistakes – such as poor grammar or 
spelling in cover documents – that were 
previously a pointer to a social engineering 
attack. 
Spamming and Phishing 
259. Overshadowed in the focus on software 
vulnerabilities after WannaCry, spamming 
and phishing continues as a significant 
threat. An industry survey of 100 UK IT 
professionals has found that over 75% 
had dealt with a security incident that was 
traced back to a phishing email. 
260. Cyber criminals continue to exploit current 
events for their phishing hooks. Action 
Fraud note phishing emails warning 
supposed victims about the Equifax breach 
and emails relating to WannaCry, purporting 
to be sent by BT.
261. HMRC has seen an increase in the number 
of phishing emails with HMRC branding 
from approximately 263,000 in the first 
half of 2016 to 553,000 in the equivalent 
period in 2017. Despite this increase, the 
percentage falling victim to phishing emails 
through disclosing personal information 
or downloading malware has declined, 
indicating an increase in customer 
awareness. 
Money Services
262. Cryptomining malware, which infects a 
victim device and surreptitiously mines 
cryptocurrencies, has increased during 
this period. According to industry, more 
than 1.65 million computers worldwide 
were infected with cryptomining malware 
during the first nine months of 2017. We 
assess it is highly likely that deployment 
of cryptomining malware has increased 
even further in the period since October 
2017 – driven to a large extent by the 
general increase in exchange rates of 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin.
263. The majority of cyber crime continues to 
be undertaken for financial gain and in 
these cases the ability to cash out forms 
a critical aspect of the criminal business 
model. We have identified money exchange 
services (that operate similarly to PayPal) 
that	facilitate	predominantly	criminal-to-
criminal payments. Whilst not explicitly 
criminal, they often additionally promise 
greater anonymity and an unwillingness to 
cooperate with law enforcement.
Forward Look
264. The General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) comes into force from May 2018. 
The provision of the regulation allows for 
significant fines against organisations 
responsible for a serious breach. The effect 
of GDPR is likely to be a much richer picture 
of	the	true	scale	-	both	size	and	regularity	
-	of	data	breaches	in	the	UK.	Recent	
industry surveys (October 2017) suggest 
that awareness of and preparedness for the 
introduction of GDPR is limited, particularly 
amongst small and medium sized 
enterprises. 
50 Commodities
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Firearms
•	 Handguns and shotguns are the most commonly used criminal firearms in the UK. Recoveries of 
automatic weapons are increasing, albeit from a low level.
•	 There has been an upward trend in criminal discharges, with the majority of weapons not having 
been previously used. This indicates a fluid illicit supply via UK and overseas sources.
•	 Converted, modified and reactivated firearms represent a sizable proportion of the illicit firearms 
market. 
•	 Risks remain around the importation and criminal use of antique and obsolete revolvers, with 
adapted/’home-loaded’	ammunition.	
•	 Discharge and seizure data point towards an increasing availability of ammunition on the criminal 
market. 
•	 Whilst the vast majority of Registered Firearms Dealers are law abiding, a number of high profile 
investigations have identified vulnerabilities for criminal exploitation.
•	 A strong connection between drugs supply and the use / recovery of firearms illustrates that 
firearms are used to protect and enable wider criminal interests.
•	 Whilst firearms make up a small proportion of commodities sold via the dark web (drugs are the 
majority), it remains a viable avenue for acquisition and supply.
•	 Upstream	supply	from	eastern	Europe	presents	an	ongoing	threat,	including	via	the	near-Europe	
nexus.
Key Judgements
Criminal Possession, Use and 
Supply
265. The level of firearms crime in the UK remains 
one of the lowest in the world with offences 
accounting for less than 1% of reported 
crime. However, the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) indicates a 27% increase 
in offending for 2016/17 (year ending June) 
and the National Ballistics Intelligence 
Service (NABIS) reports an upward trend in 
discharges since 2013/14i. Discharges per 
incident and large ammunition seizures 
i ONS statistics include offences with noxious sprays, 
stun	devices,	imitation	guns	and	other	non-lethal	firearms	
whereas NABIS figures refer only to discharges from lethal 
barrelled weapons.
also indicate an increasing availability of 
ammunition on the criminal market.
266. The vast majority of criminal firearm 
discharges in 2016/17 again involved 
weapons not previously discharged in 
crime, suggesting a sufficiently fluid supply. 
This trend is assessed as largely due to 
firearms entering the UK from overseas 
and previously legal weapons entering 
criminal hands after being stolen, diverted 
or modified within the UK. 
267. The majority of criminal firearms are 
handguns (pistols and revolvers), which 
also cause the majority of fatalities. The 
Assessment of the Threat
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second most popular criminal firearm is the 
shotgun, with increasing incidents reported. 
Fully automatic firearmsii are seldom used in 
the UK. 
268. Firearms converted, modified or reactivated 
constitute a sizable proportion of the illicit 
market. In addition to legislative, availability 
and pricing factors, this is likely to reflect 
the existence of illicit facilities within the 
UK and/or acquisition of already ‘upgraded’ 
weapons from overseas.
269. The geographical concentration of firearm 
recoveries and discharges continues to be 
in the main metropolitan areas, with some 
provicial forces also having significant 
issues (often relating to ‘county lines’iii drugs 
supply and community demographics).
270. There remains a strong connection between 
drug supply and firearms use and recovery, 
further indicating that firearms are used to 
protect and enable other criminal interests. 
When automatic weapons are recovered, 
they are usually linked to drug supply. 
271. Firearms make up a small proportion of 
commodities sold via the dark web, with 
drugs being the majority. However, the dark 
web remains a viable avenue for acquisition 
and supply, including for individuals with 
limited or no known criminal association. 
Lawful to Unlawful
272. NABIS assesses the threat to the public 
from	lawfully-held	firearms	being	used	in	
crime as low. However, most shotguns used 
criminally in the UK are likely to have been 
held legally on certificate and subsequently 
lost, stolen or diverted before entering the 
criminal market. They are also modified with 
the barrel, stock, or both being shortened.
ii A fully automatic firearm is one that continuously 
discharges bullets until the trigger is released or magazine/
chamber is empty and includes assault rifles and submachine 
guns.
iii The supply of Class A drugs from urban hubs to 
provincial towns.
273. The significant use and recovery in criminal 
circumstances of imported antique and 
obsolete-calibre	firearms	highlights	
continued risks around their onward supply 
to criminal groups (often with adapted 
and home loaded ammunition). Their illicit 
supply, including via Registered Firearms 
Dealers (RFDs), has led to high profile and 
complex operations and prosecutions. Whilst 
the vast majority of RFDs are law abiding, 
vulnerabilities for criminal exploitation have 
been identified.  Following a Law Commission 
Review and new definitions under the 
Police and Crime Act 2017, a Home Office 
consultation is also underway. 
International Supply
274. There remains an ongoing supply of firearms 
into the UK from overseas. In this regard, 
trafficking from eastern Europe through 
near Europe is a key concern. Facilitated 
by international transport and trading 
infrastructure, Belgium and The Netherlands 
are key nexus points of consolidation and 
onward trafficking of illicit commodities, 
including drugs and firearms. Trafficking 
to the UK is enabled by ferry and Channel 
Tunnel routes. Firearms detected entering 
the	UK	on	Roll-On/Roll-Off	(‘RoRo’)	services	
through ferry ports are concealed in private/
tourist cars (and, historically, motorcycles) or 
commercial vehicles. 
275. In October 2017, a vehicle was used to 
attempt to smuggle 10 handguns, a quantity 
of ammunition and three sound moderators 
(concealed in a holdall, together with 37kg 
of cocaine and 7kg of heroin) into the UK 
via	Dover	on	behalf	of	a	UK-based	OCG.	This	
seizure, linked to the arrest of a UK official, is 
unusual in that the firearms were from more 
than one manufacturer and were of various 
models, indicating onward supply capacity.
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276. Detections of firearms trafficked via general 
maritime (small boats/private marinas) or 
sea/air freight, air passenger or general 
aviation (light aircraft/private airfields) are 
uncommon. However, they remain exploited 
for smuggling other commodities and are 
viable ways of smuggling weapons into the 
UK.
277. Considering the current Common Travel 
Area (CTA)iv and historic access to firearms 
within Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland, the land border between them 
provides another viable route for trafficking 
firearms to the UK. 
Forward Look
Upstream Risks
278. The Czech Republic parliament has agreed 
to alter its constitution to allow for firearms 
to be legally held when national security 
is threatened. This amendment represents 
a challenge to EU gun control rules which 
typically restrict civilians from possessing 
certain	kinds	of	semi-automatic	weapons.	
As an EU Member State bordering Germany, 
Austria, Slovakia and Poland, there is a risk 
that firearms and ammunition held legally 
under this provision may be diverted to 
other countries, including the UK. 
279. Other upstream firearms supply risk areas 
include the Western Balkans. Firearms from 
the region, including automatic weapons, 
are commonly identified in mainland 
Europe, including near Europe. Other more 
recent conflict zones such as Ukraine, Libya 
and Syria are considered potential threats.
Advancing Technology
280. In 2017, the first known UK seizure of 3D 
printed firearms was made in London, 
together with component parts for a 
firearm and a digital guide on how to 
produce 3D printed firearms. Complete 
iv The CTA is a travel zone that comprises the Republic 
of Ireland, the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, Isle of Man, 
Jersey and Guernsey.
3D metal handguns have been printed 
elsewhere, but their viability is uncertain 
and complexities and costs are prohibitive. 
However, technological developments and 
cost reduction over time, as anticipated 
with thermoplastics, may encourage 
experimentation.
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Drugs
•	 Drug	misuse-related	deaths	in	the	UK	increased	in	2017.	The	emergence	of	Fentanyl,	Carfentanil,	
Analogues and Precursors (FCAP) has contributed to this rise: current reporting states 122 FCAP 
related deaths. FCAP are currently being seen in overseas drugs markets causing high numbers of 
deaths;	their	emergence	in	the	UK	is	of	significant	concern.
•	 Our improved understanding of the significant harm caused by ‘county lines’ drug supply networks 
has led to an increased prioritisation to counter the threat.  These groups are causing significant 
harm, including violence and firearms use, impacting on all police forces. The county lines groups 
continue to exploit young and vulnerable people, who are exposed to physical, mental and sexual 
harm.  Groups have a proven ability to adapt their operating methods and practices in order to 
evade intervention and strengthen their criminal enterprise.
•	 OCGs	are	using	new	links	with	source	countries	to	streamline	their	activity	and	provide	end-to-end	
services. Profits are high at all stages of drug trafficking but maximised for those with upstream 
access.
•	 It is likely that the UK drugs market and the associated crime will continue to grow and cause 
increasing harm to the UK. 
•	 Cocaine and heroin production have continued to rise in 2017. Demand for all common drug types 
remains high in the UK and the use of crack cocaine has increased. Crack cocaine is linked to 
county lines drugs supply networks and has been identified as a driver for an increase in serious 
violence. 
281. Demand for all common drug types remains 
high in the UK. Profits are high at all stages 
of drug trafficking but maximised for those 
with upstream access. Increased production 
and supply has reduced the need for 
suppliers to adulterate. Consequently, 
cocaine and heroin purity at street level 
remains high. 
282. British traffickers remain a significant threat 
and remain active within the UK wholesale 
market. However criminals from the Balkans 
continue to dominate within the wholesale 
cocaine market, with a presence in all major 
UK cities and towns and operating supply 
networks reaching back to source and 
transit countries. 
283. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
report that in 2016 there were 3,744 drug 
poisoning deaths registered involving 
both legal and illegal drugs in England and 
Wales. This is an increase of 2% and the 
highest since comparable statistics began 
in 1993. Of these 3,744 deaths, 69% (2,593) 
were drug misuse deaths. 54% of all drug 
related deaths involved heroin and / or 
morphine. 
Fentanyl, Carfentanil, Analogues 
& Precursors (FCAP)
284. In early 2017 an unusually high number of 
heroin overdoses occurred in the north of 
England. The detection of FCAP in some 
Key Judgements
Assessment of the Threat
55Commodities
post mortems led to toxicology retesting 
of overdose fatalities in the area, resulting 
in a total of 122 deaths (as of March 2018) 
being identified as linked to FCAP abuse. 
The emergence of FCAP in the UK drugs 
market is of concern. It has previously been 
seen in US and Canadian drugs markets, 
among others, where it has contributed to 
an ongoing synthetic opioid epidemic. 
County Lines
285. ‘County lines’ relates to the supply of Class 
A drugs (primarily crack cocaine and heroin) 
from an urban hub into rural and coastal 
towns or county locations. County lines 
drug supply networks are reported to be 
impacting on all 43 police forces in England 
and Wales, Police Scotland and British 
Transport Police. Criminal groups continue 
to pose a significant threat to young and 
vulnerable people, who are exposed to 
physical, mental and sexual harm. The 
groups use a range of methods to identify 
potential victims. The consequences of 
county line markets include serious violence 
and physical harm, incidents of kidnap, use 
of weapons (including firearms), ruthless 
debt control, turf wars and homicide. 
286. Gang members and those they exploit 
continue to be transient between urban 
hubs	(exporting)	and	non-urban	areas	
(importing) such as rural, coastal and 
market towns, but with an emerging trend 
for some offenders to settle within the 
community in which the county lines market 
is established. 
287. London continues to be the predominant 
urban source of county lines offending, 
although a number of other export 
hubs, including Liverpool, Manchester, 
Birmingham and Wolverhampton (as well as 
other towns and cities), have been reported 
across the country reflecting the growth and 
evolution of the threat.  
Upstream Production
288. Opium production in Afghanistan increased 
by 87% to a record level of 9,000 metric 
tonnes in 2017. The area of opium poppy 
cultivation also increased to a record 
328,000 hectares in 2017, up 63% 
compared with 210,000 in 2016. 
289. Cocaine production in Colombia has 
increased by 120% since 2012. Production 
in 2015 was 646 metric tonnes and rose 
34% to an estimated 866 metric tonnes in 
2016. 2017 production is estimated to be 
in	the	region	of	1,000-1,100	tonnes.	Coca	
cultivation has also surged over recent 
years with a 52% increase in cultivation 
area from 96,000 hectares (ha) in 2015 to 
146,000 ha in 2016. 
The Supply Chain
290. Cocaine seizures across Europe reached a 
record high in 2016, with 60 tonnes being 
seized from containers alone. We assess 
that the largest volumes of cocaine continue 
to be trafficked via canalised maritime 
traffic. 
291. South American ports remain key locations 
for the loading of drug consignments via 
container. During the period January to June 
2017, Santos in Brazil was the port of origin 
for over a third of all European cocaine 
seizures from containers. 
292. Heroin continues to be trafficked in large 
quantities via the ‘southern route’ through 
the Indian Ocean towards Europe via South 
Africa and West Africa. The amount of heroin 
transported on the southern route appears 
to be growing.
293. Heroin and cocaine generate significant 
competition between rival OCGs from 
production to user. Feuds over drugs in 
transit, control of markets and protection 
of assets / income are common, often 
resulting in violence, kidnap and the 
criminal use of firearms. 
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294. Corruption exists at every stage of the 
drug supply chain. The use of corrupt port 
and airport officials to circumvent normal 
customs	controls	is	a	key	aspect	of	all	‘rip-
off’ activity. 
Synthetics and Cannabis
295. Since January 2017, two tonnes of 
precursor chemicals have been seized. 
These chemicals are primarily used in the 
illicit manufacture of amphetamine and 
methamphetamine. Estimates suggest 
that this volume of precursor chemicals 
has the potential yield of somewhere 
between	1,000-1,200kg	of	unadulterated	
amphetamine sulphate with a street value 
of up to £40 million. During the same period 
methamphetamine street prices have 
decreased	significantly;	there	is	a	realistic	
possibility this indicates an increase in 
availability. In relation to New Psychoactive 
Substances (NPS), China remains the 
predominant source of supplies entering the 
UK.
296. We continue to see significant seizures of 
cannabis at the UK border. Additionally 
there are regular disruptions of domestic 
cannabis grows, varying from as few as ten 
plants, up to warehouse quantities.  
Forward Look
297. In order to establish a better understanding 
of the scale of the FCAP threat to the UK, 
it will be necessary to start to consistently 
capture intelligence from treatment 
providers, police forces (including testing 
in	custody),	prisons,	and	in	post-mortem	
testing. 
298. Reporting on global drug purchases over 
the dark web in the UK has increased by 7% 
in	2017;	the	United	States	dropped	by	1.8%	
whilst the overall global average increased 
by 0.3%. 
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